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I 
Abstract 
This study investigates the effects that various ownership structures have on company performance. It is assumed that the ownership structure of the firm dictates the 
manner in which the firm monitors its managers. It is further assumed that the objective 
of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The study therefore analyses which 
ownership structure provides shareholders with the greatest returns. Such a system would 
add the most to an economy's efficiency. It was concluded that of the three systems 
identified, not one system provided shareholders with a return significantly different from 
the others. 
The study added to the current South African debate as to whether or not the 
concentration of economic power detracts from the country's economic efficiency. 
Statistical evidence proves that companies owned by any of the large South African 
groupings are no less productive than companies otherwise owned. .-
Notice 
It is to be noted by the reader that the majority of the work on this thesis was concluded 
in 1996. As the market that it sets out to analyse is dynamic, there may be facts in the 
thesis that apply to 1996, and are no longer necessarily valid. 
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Introduction 
A number of studies both internationally such as Shome and Singh, 1995, McConnel and Servaes, 1990 and Sheehan and Holderness, 1988, also locally Day and Uliana, 
1990 and Cohen and Uliana, 1990, have attempted to prove that the ownership structure 
of a firm affects the firm's performance. This study strives to take those conclusions a 
step further. It suggests a reason, while analysing managerial monitoring systems, why 
the ownership structure of a firm should indeed influence the firm's performance. 
The modern corporation has allowed for the evolution of professional managers (Berle 
and Means, 1932). These managers are said to be self-maximising individuals, who are 
more often motivated by power and control rather than maximising stockholder 
investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is the potential ofthis managerial class to 
divert the organisation's resources into sub-optimum investments which necessitates the 
formation of monitoring systems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The monitoring system 
·that is best able to prevent managerial incompetencies, will provide a particular company 
with its most efficient workings and enhance shareholder wealth to its maximum (Hill 
and Jones, 1992) (Hart, 1995} (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the need for efficient 
managerial monitoring is paramount; on a micro level for any company to reach its most 
profitable point and on a macro level for a country as a whole to be efficient. 
This study equates different ownership structures with different managerial monitoring 
systems and attempts to identify the differences between the various systems. The study 
reviews corporate ownership and identifies the effect various ownership patterns have on 
company performance. It is assumed that a particular ownership structure dictates the 
method through which managers are monitored and as such the study attempts to 
highlight which ownership structure best monitors the agent/principle relationship. The 
various monitoring systems will be compared against their ability to produce shareholder 
returns. The return to shareholder measure is therefore used as a yardstick by which to 
determine the success of a particular system. In order to determine which monitoring 
system provides the best shareholder returns, the measure_§. w!l,l be tested statistically, thus 
ensuring that hard statistical evidence supports the accompanying financial theory. 
s 
Background 
The growth of the modem corporation and its resulting separation of ownership and control, has given rise to professional managers who run the organisation on behalf 
of the owners (Berle and Means, 1932). It was the sheer size of the modem company that 
made it a very difficult organisation to manage (Berle and Means, 1932). Owners were 
therefore obliged to hire professionals to assist them in managing their companies (Berle 
and Means, 1932 ). An agent-principal relationship developed between the shareholders 
and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The principals (shareholders) who owned the company, engaged the services of agents 
{professional managers) to perform on their behalf. This relationship facilitated the 
delegation of certain decision-making authority from the owners to the agent (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) (Fama, 1980). Managers were placed in a position where potential 
existed for them to maximise their own welfare at the expense of their principals (Ross, 
1973). As Jensen and Meckling (1976, pp85) stated: 
If both parties to the relationship (share-holder/manager) are utility maximisers there is 
good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. 
In order for any organisation to run effectively, it became paramount that the agent-
principal relationship was carefully monitored (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b) (Fama and Jensen, 1983a) (Jensen, 1989). However, as companies grew 
larger and their shareholdings dispersed further, the incentive for shareholders to monitor 
management diminished (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Monitoring is a public good: if one 
shareholder's improved monitoring leads to improved company performance, all 
shareholders benefit (Hart, 1995). Therefore, given that monitoring is costly, each 
shareholder will free-ride in the hope that other shareholders will do the monitoring 
(Hart, 1995). Unfortunately, most shareholders think the same and the possibility exists 
that little monitoring will take place (Hart, 1995). 
The inability to monitor management effectively leads to a loss of efficiency in a 
company and a resulting loss in wealth to shareholders (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
Shareholders expecting to make the maximum return on their investment must ensure that 
managerial behaviour is kept in check, or else risk losing out to managerial excesses (Hill 
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and Jones, 1992). It is therefore the shareholders who are charged with this responsibility 
of monitoring management (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
(Manne, 1965). The challenge for shareholders is to devise monitoring systems that can 
management anti ensuring that wealth losses are kept to a minimum. 
The agent/principle characteristic of the modem corporation has allowed modem 
companies the opportunity of operating at less than their full potential. This is due to the 
fact that managers (agents) have the potential to redirect company resources into less 
optimal projects. The problem for shareholders is therefore to develop methods to ensure 
that their companies are being run at the most efficient level possible. It is this problem 
and the various methods that have developed to counter-act this problem, which this 
thesis intends to address. 
Over time different shareholding structures have developed, each with its own unique 
manner ofkeeping managers in check. Various shareholding structures monitor managers 
in various ways (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). For example, in companies that are owned by 
a few significant shareholders, 1 it is to be expected that the shareholders themselves will 
monitor management. Significant shareholders are expected to take an active interest in 
monitoring managers. These investors with large investment stakes are not likely to shirk 
their duty of monitoring management, as the costs associated with the shirking are simply 
too high (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The free-rider2 problem, which is best evident in a 
company with a wide dispersion of shareholders and no significant owners, is therefore 
not as prevalent in companies with a few significant shareholders. 
Companies with widely dispersed shareholder structures can not rely on shareholders to 
monitor managers. These companies are forced to rely on the efficient workings of the 
capital market to ensure that their managers are monitored (Fama, 1980). Managers are 
monitored through professional consortiums that attempt to identify poor management 
and buy out such companies at low prices, in the process replacing poor management 
teams (Smith and Jensen, 1985). This type of monitoring system was prevalent in the 
USA in the early eighties, when groups and individuals that later became known as 
"corporate raiders" bought out poorly managed companiesand replaced their 
management (Pound, 1992) (Jensen, 1987). "Take-over specialists" or "raiders" such as 
Icahn, Posner, Steinberg and Pickens were at the forefront of the drive to force managers 
to behave efficiently or else risk losing their jobs (Jensen, 1987). 
1 Investors that have invested large amounts of their own personal wealth into a company and own a 
substantial percentage of the company 
2 The shirking of managerial monitoring associated with firms of diffuse ownership (Demsetz and LehJ1, 
1985) 
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The capital market not only provides the conduit for "raiders" to evaluate companies, 
through share prices, but also an effective avenue through which to purchase company 
stock (Fama and Jensen, I983a) (Manne, 1965). This system of managerial monitoring 
~ . ' ... ,.," 
prepared to purchase stock which they believe to be underpriced. The threat oftake-overs 
prevents managers from running companies poorly, as incumbent managers realise 
mismanagement will result in their dismissals (Jensen and Ruback)l983)(Jensen, 1987). 
The system does however allow ordinary minority shareholders to free-ride on the 
workings of an efficient capital market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
A third system of managerial monitoring relies on large groupings, either institutional or 
corporate, to ensure that the managers are properly monitored. These large groupings rely 
on an internal system of managerial monitoring to ensure that the managers do not 
underperform. 
Gerson ( 1992) identified three models through which corporations are controlled by their 
shareholders and managers. Each model relies on a defined shareholding structure in 
order to monitor effectively and it is this link between managerial monitoring and 
shareholding structures that this thesis will explore. The three models closely resemble 
the three structures defined above and are listed below. 
Modell: A system in which not only the percentage claim to dividends but also the 
shareholder's voting rights of the corporations are diffusely distributed. This system is 
effectively built on the premise of one-share-one-vote. In such an environment free-riding 
among shareholders is likely to be endemic and it is to be expected that this system will 
demonstrate very low voter participation rates at shareholder meetings. Managers are 
disciplined in such a system through the threats of hostile take-overs. 
Model2: This system is characterised by the absolute majority of the effective 
shareholder voting rights being held by a single family (usually the founding 
entrepreneur's family) or some other stable, identifiable coalition. However, the 
coalition's percentage claim to dividends in the companies that it controls is not 
necessarily equivalent to its voting rights. Indeed, this system permits coalitions (via the 
issue of dual class shares or the formation of pyramid companies) to maintain voting 
control while giving up control over the dividend flows of the company. Since the 
coalition has effective control over the company, the threat of hostile take-overs, which 
was evidenced in Model 1 as a disciplining source for managers, is not available. Senior 
managers are directly accountable to the owners and have very limited power. The 
controlling shareholders discipline the managers and ensure that they perform. 
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Model 3: In this system control of the corporations reside in the hands of large financial 
or corporate institutions. It is not unusual to witness corporations being controlled by a 
consortium of institutions. The management of the operating companies is held 
"~CC"11~t~b1e +11 +l->e ].-,roe in~t~·~, ... L;O"'<: OT cr-.-·•-.-:: T• :~ '.,. 
o,.;. .._,._... ,,,..,..., L lJ \., ... ·'-1.::- ~ ..... • l-l .. 0. lt..... ::- , ·, • •• • • 
managers are kept in check and that the operating companies perform adequately. 
Gerson (1992) stated that although each country has its own unique set of features that 
characterise its system of corporate governance, these three models represent the broad 
outline of any governance system. This thesis will deal with each of the stated models 
and their ability to monitor managers in a South African setting. It is therefore necessary 
to gain an understanding of the South African (S.A.) economy and the monitoring 
systems that have evolved in the country. 
The South African economy is currently dominated by corporate groupings. These 
groupings, which are vast and diverse in size, control close to 80% of the market 
capitalisation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) (Gerson, 1992) (Savage, 1987). 
Examples of such groupings include the Anglo American Corporation and the Rembrandt 
group. The question facing South African shareholders is whether these group structures 
present the most effective manner of monitoring managers or whether an alternative 
corporate structure provides a better monitm for management. 
The African National Congress (ANC) has spoken strongly against the corporate 
groupings (ANC policy guidelines, 1992). It is their opinion that the groupings have been 
detrimental to the balanced development of the economy. It is their intention to limit the 
power of the large South African (S.A.) groups via the implementation of anti-trust and 
anti-merger regulations. The ANC is under the impression that such policies would lead 
to greater efficiency in the private sector (ANC policy guidelines, 1992). 
The theory of managerial ism would tend to support the ANC viewpoint. The theory 
suggests that managers attempt to maximise asset and company size instead of 
shareholder wealth (Fox and Hamilton, 1994 ). Proponents of this theory therefore believe 
that the corporate groupings are merely manifestations of powerful management and do 
not actually add wealth to the shareholders (Fox and Hamilton, 1994). Thus it is believed 
that the groupings are indeed formed out of management's desire to ensure their own job 
security rather than through the need for effective managerial monitoring. 
The objective of this thesis is to analyse the manner in which managers are monitored3 in 
the South African context. Specific attention will be paid to the large South African 
3 The term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing managers. It includes efforts on the 
part of the sblreholders to control the behaviour of the n~:ma:i;ers. 
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corporate groupings and the methods that these groupings utilise to monitor their 
managers. The thesis will attempt to define the monitoring structure which best monitors 
managers. The findings of this research will contribute towards the debate as to whether 
value. It is also intended that the findings should add a South African focus to the agency 
theory of finance. 
This thesis is divided into six sections: 
Section 1 places the study in relation to agency theory and the evolution of the 
agent-principle literature. 
Section 2 discusses the various systems available to monitor managers. 
Section 3 is a brief account of the evolution of the South African corporate 
groupmgs. 
Section 4 is an analysis ofthe methodology of the study. 
Section 5 presents the results and conclusion of the study as well as a number of 
areas for future research. 
The overall conclusion of the study is presented in Section 6. 
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Section I 
" 
, . 
·Development of the firm and the 
·Agency Theory. 
I I 
... 
'I 
Introduction 
This section first sets out the historical evolution of the firm; it then defines the firm and lastly presents the arguments surrounding the agency theory. The section 
introduces the essential problem with which this thesis is concerned; namely: that the 
development of the modem corporation has facilitated a managerial class that, if 
maximum efficiency is to be obtained, must be properly monitored. It is this necessity to 
monitor managers and the reasons behind the monitoring that this first section intends to 
set out. 
1.1) The Firm (modern corporation) 
The first developments of the corporation can be traced back to the Roman Empire. The 
idea of the corporation was slow to grow and developed out of public necessity (Kempin 
& Wiesen, 1983). Associations ofindividuals ofthe same trade or crafts developed. 
These colleges, as they were referred to, had no rights or ownership as a group. Whatever 
property such a college possessed, was purely private property (Kempin & Wiesen, 
1983). It was only by sovereign power, the state, that corporations could be created 
(Kempin & Wiesen, 1983). These corporations were then allowed to develop their own 
legal personality, separate from their members. The Governments of the day were 
restrictive in their granting of corporate charters and it was usually only the very wealthy 
- those who could afford to bribe state officials - who could expect to gain corporate 
charters (Kempin & Wiesen, 1983). 
The growth of the modem corporation was the result of industrial and manufacturing 
concerns growing at such a rate that individual fortunes were no longer adequate to 
finance such enterprises (Solomon, Stevenson and Schwartz, 1987). The industrial 
revolution of the eighteenth century placed unprecedented levels of demand on capital 
investment and manpower. The result was the early development of the modem economic 
organisation known as the firm (Berle and Meane 1932). The firm received further 
momentum in its development after the Second World War when, once again, vast 
demands were placed on industry to produce (Jassim, Dexter and Sidhu, 1988). 
The modem firm has allowed resource owners the opportunity to increase productivity 
through co-operative specialisation (Fama and Jensen, 1983b) (Smith and Jensen, 1985). 
It was this aspect of the firm that allowed owners to hire managers to run their companies 
for them (Alchain & Demsetz, 1972). The large size of the firm and the demands it made 
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on an individual's capital, led to ownership patterns developing which encouraged the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle and Meane, 1932). The modem firm 
differs therefore from most other business entities in its ability to allow for this risk 
while managers do not need to own the firm (Aichian and Demsetz, 1972) (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a). 
The modem corporation thus evolved from its early form as an ad-hoc organisation that 
was as much a vehicle for conferring monopoly privileges on a small group as it was a 
legal form for conducting business, into a distinctive entity, legally available to all 
(Solomon, Stevenson and Schwartz, 1987). The development ofthe corporation has 
marked capitalist society and allowed for an efficient business form to manage the factors 
of production (Alchain & Demsetz, 1972). 
A distinctive set of financial literature has evolved from the development of the firm. 
This literature, known collectively as the theory of the firm, defines the modem 
corporation and its objectives. The following section serves as an overview ofthe 
developments in this sphere of financial literature. 
1.2)Theory ofthefirm 
Early work on the theory of the firm was conducted by Knight (1923) and later advanced 
by Coase (1937). The firm was viewed as the exception in a system governed overall by 
the workings of the price mechanism. The main motivation for establishing a firm was 
that it avoided the costs associated with the use of the price mechanism. The work ofboth 
Knight and Coase saw the entrepreneur as the sole risk-taker and controller of the firm. It 
was, however, Coase who pointed out that a professional management class may exist, 
and that this class would be responsible for co-ordinating the activities delegated to them. 
Berle and Means (1932) highlighted the evolution of the corporation as the reason for 
owners no longer being in control of their firms. They argued that large companies had 
come to lack the centre of ownership necessary to ensure control for their owners. 
Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without 
appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development (Berle 
and Means, 1932, pp 66). Thus the shift of ownership of companies from the individual 
or entrepreneur to shareholders has led to the emergence of professional managers. 
Nearly forty years after the work of Coase (193 7), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) advanced 
the theory of the firm. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) defined the firm as a policing device 
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utilised when joint team production was present. It was the ability of the firm to monitor 
and discipline team members that was seen as the main reason for establishing firms. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) objected to the notion that activities within the firm were 
g(n..:e~~d h~.r :-~~~tt,c-rity c.s f1rst d~f:red t~-v Cc:lse (~ 93'i!. They e~n::t..::::is~C tl:e :-r·le 0f 
contracts as vehicles for voiumary exchange within the context of the tirm. 
Jensen and Meckling's seminal paper of 1976 was the first exhibition of the modem 
agency theorem. In their paper (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp85) they defined the 
private corporation as a: 
Legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships and which is also 
characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on the assets and cash flows of 
the organisation which can generally be sold without permission of the other contracting 
individuals. 
Jensen and Meckling viewed contractual relations as the essence of the firm. It was this 
multitude of complex relationships (contracts) between the firm and th~ owners of labour, 
material, capital inputs and the consumers' output that defined the firm. To enquire 
whether the firm had a social responsibility or what its objectives were, was totally 
misleading. Jensen and Meckling believed that the personalization of the firm was wrong. 
Firms were merely legal fictions that served as a focus for a complex process in which 
conflicting objectives were brought into equilibrium. In this sense, the behaviour of the 
firm is similar to that of the market; i.e. the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The contractual view of the firm highlights the numerous parties and intricate contracts 
from which a firm is established. The firm may be viewed as a focal point around which 
various parties contract to ensure their own position is maximised (Jensen and Meckilng, 
1976). Owners contract with managers in order to reap the benefits associated with the 
dispersion of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). It is implied that the managers have a responsibility to ensure that the welfare of 
the owners is maximised. If this were not the case, owners would not contract with 
managers and either run the firm themselves or invest in management teams that would 
maximise their welfare (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). 
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1.3) Agency Theory 
Agency theory, which. IS a suo-sel of the literature on the theory of ri1e iirrn, attempts to 
gain an understanding into the contrac~s around which the firm is established (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory makes specific attempts to understand the workings of 
the manager-shareholder relationship. It is this agent-principle relationship which is 
fundamental to this research and from which the related hypotheses are developed. 
Narrowly defined, an agency relationship is a contract in which one or more persons 
(principal(s)) engage another person (agent) to take actions on their (principals) behalf 
which involves the delegation of some decision making authority to the agent. 
(Smith and Jensen, 1985, p96) 
The emergence of the modern corporation and with it the evolvement of a professional 
class of managers, resulted in conflicts developing between owners and managers. In 
simplistic terms, agency theory suggests that management are likely to act in their own 
interests rather than in the interests of the shareholders (Uliana, 1989) (Hill and Jones, 
1992). 
Shareholders delegate authority to professional managers (Barnea, Haligan & Senbert, 
1993) (Smith and Jensen, 1985). The delegation of decision-making authority may give 
rise to conflicts of interest between agents (managers) and principals (shareholders). The 
central assumption surrounding agency theory is that individuals choose actions that 
maximise their own personal welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) (Barnea, Haligan & 
Senbert, 1993). As Adam Smith noted over 200 years ago: 
The directors iJf companies Ooint-stock), however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than their own it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not 
for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having ir. 
Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company. 
Wealth ofNations, 1776, p700 
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Therefore, unless shareholders can ensure that their welfare is directly linked to the 
welfare of the managers, one can expect managers to make decisions which would not 
directly benefit shareholders, but rather themselves (Barnea, Haligan & Senbert, 1993). 
The conflict which exists between managers and owners can be ascribed to three main 
factors (Jensen and Smith, 1985) : 
• Choice of Effort: An increase of effort on the part of the manager would normally 
increase the value of the firm. The increased effort represents a cost to the manager in 
its demand on his human capitaL Therefore, shareholders would require the manager 
to exert as much effort as possible in the performance of his duties, whereas managers 
would opt to perform their tasks with the bare minimum of effort. The less effort 
exerted by management, the greater managers can save in respect of their human 
capital expenses. 
• Differential Risk Exposure: Managers have a significant investment in the finn in 
terms oftheir human capital. Shareholders, on the other hand, usually have diversified 
portfolios with only a limited portion of their wealth invested in any one firm. 
Managers are therefore exposed to total risk, whereas shareholders are exposed only 
to market, or portfolio, risk. 
• Differential Time Horizons: The manager's interest in the firm is limited to his 
period with the firm. The shareholders interest is indefinite, since the benefits 
accruing beyond his time horizon, after he has sold his shares, will be of interest to 
the acquiring shareholder and so reflected in the price at which the shares are traded. 
It is virtually impossible for the principal or the agent, at zero cost, to ensure that the 
agent makes the optimal decisions from the principal's viewpoint. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) defined agency costs of comprising three distinct components : 
a) Monitoring expenditures by the principal 
b) Bonding expenditure by the agent 
c) The residual loss 
The sum of these three components is equal to the total agency cost. Agency costs arise 
because contracts are not costlessly written (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). 
It is through close monitoring and the development of appropriate incentive measures that 
shareholders can attempt to limit divergences from their interest by managers. The costs 
associated with this monitoring are referred to as monitoring costs (Fama and Jensen, 
19S3a) (Fama, 1980) (Smith and Jensen, 1985). In addition, in some situations it may be 
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favourable to managers to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that they will 
not take 'certain actions which could harm the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). In 
most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and 
decisions and those decisions which would maximise the shareholders wealth. The loss in 
welfare experienced by the principal as a result of a divergence in optimal decisions 
between himself and the agent is referred to as the "residual loss" (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). . 
The agency cost literature deals with the conflicts between agents and principals. The 
manager, as a fundamentally self interested corporate stakeholder and one capable of 
taking actions or exploiting information hidden from shareholders, cannot always be 
relied upon to act in the best interests of the company's owners (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Recognising this possibility, rational shareholders are induced to develop 
appropriate incentives and safeguards to prevent self interested opportunism by 
managers. The cost of designing and running these systems and the shareholders value 
lost due to the private consumption of corporate wealth by managers, are the "agency 
costs" borne by the shareholders (Kester, 1993). 
It is these "agency costs" and the methods that have evolved to limit them, that this thesis 
tends to analyse. The key to understanding the agency problem is the recognition that the 
parties to a contract bear the agency costs of the relationship (Smith and Jensen 1985). 
1.4) Separation of Ownership and Control 
If a firm is owned and managed by the same person, the individual will make decisions 
relating to the firm which maximise his utility. These decisions involve both pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits. The optimum mix of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits is 
achieved when the marginal utility derived from both benefits is equal. In such a situation 
both benefits would weigh equally with the owner (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) (Fama, 
1980). 
If the owner-manager sells equity claims, agency costs will be generated by the 
divergence between his interests and those of the outside shareholders, since he will bear 
only a fraction of the costs of any non-pecuniary reward he takes in maximising his own 
utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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1.4.1) Disadvantages: 
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greater incentive for owners to shirk their responsibility. The benefit derived by the 
owner from shirking is his ability to use his time and ability on other tasks and 
indulgences. This benefit accrues entirely to him (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The cost of 
his shirking - presumably the poorer performance of the firm - is shared by all the 
stockholders in proportion to their percentage ownership. The more concentrated the 
ownership, the greater the degree to which costs and benefits are borne by the same 
owner, the less it would be favourable for the owner to shirk, as he is now losing 
potentially more ofhis own wealth (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The shirking associated 
with diffuse ownership is known as the free-rider problem. An example is given by 
Cheung (1985) of a large group of workers who owned a river boat in China. The owners 
agreed to hire a monitor to whip them. The reason was that in this way the owners 
ensured that none of them would shirk their responsibility. This example illustrates quite 
dramatically the disadvantages of diffuse ownership. Clearly, in today's modern world 
we would not expect owners to hire whippers to ensure that they maintained their 
responsibilities. However, methods have evolved to ensure that even managers in 
diffusely owned corporations are monitored. These will be discussed in detail later. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulated that prospective minority shareholders would 
realise that the owner-manager interests would diverge from theirs. Efficient capital 
markets would therefore price companies so as to reflect the monitoring costs and the 
effect ofthe divergence between manager interests and those of prospective owners. 
Following Jensen and Meckling's argument, the market discounts companies with 
divergent shareholding structures in order to account for the extra costs shareholders must 
pay to ensure managers perform (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Their argument was further 
substantiated by a study conducted by Holderness and Sheehan (1988). Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) found that stock prices reacted positively with announcements of trades 
resulting in majority shareholders. They concluded that major shareholding blocks were 
formed in order to achieve better monitoring over managers and the market rewarded 
such moves with an increase in the underlying share price (Holderness and Sheehan, 
1988). 
The previous section on the development of the firm and the intricacies associated with 
the establishment of shareholder manager contracts, has highlighted the problems for 
owners (shareholders). Given these inefficiencies, the question may be asked as to the 
reason for the existence of the modern corporation. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that 
given a rational world, there must be advantages to counterbalance the disadvantages 
associated with the firm, or else no firms would exist. Fama and Jensen (1983b) argued 
that all forms of organisations competed against each other in their ability to deliver 
products demanded by consumers at the lowest price, while covering costs. Under 
general conditions, therefore, the type of organisation which survived was efficient in its 
18 
utilisation of resources. The firm's survival is therefore testament to its ability, even with 
its disadvantages, to produce efficiently (Smith and Jensen, 1985) (Fama 1980). 
1.4.2) Advantages: 
The modem firm and its ability to allow for the separation of decision making from the 
residual claims (ownership from control), has allowed residual claimants (those who have 
the right to the net cash flows of the organisation) to take no active role in the 
organisation (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The residual claims of firms are said to be free and 
unrestricted, in the sense that : 
1) Stockholders are not required to have any other role in the organisation 
2) The residual claims are freely transferable 
3) The residual claims are rights in net cash flows for the life of the organisation 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b) 
This gives rise to certain advantages: 
• Restricted Risk Sharing 
Each shareholder is able to decide the extent to which he wishes to bear risk. Since his 
shares are freely tradable, he can diversify his risk across a portfolio of organisations. 
This lowers the risk of the individual shareholder, as instead of investing in only one 
organisation, he now has a whole spectrum, as large as the market, in which he is able to 
invest. The lower risk which shareholders face as a result of being able to diversify, 
lowers the cost of capital for companies. A company's capital is priced only according to 
its market risk and not its total risk. Therefore the benefits of diversification, felt by the 
shareholders, is passed on to the firm. Concentrating risk on a specific group of claimants 
can create efficiencies by substantially reducing the duplication of information costs 
incurred by other contracting parties. 
(Fama & Jensen 1983a) (Smith and Jensen, 1985) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
• Specialisation of Management 
Investors, people with capital willing to bear risk, are not necessarily competent 
managers, whereas competent managers do not necessarily have the funds available 
to start and finance their own enterprises . The combination of the two parties are 
essential in creating a successful firm. Through the separation of ownership and control, 
skilled managers may be acquired with the necessary talents to co-ordinate and run a 
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complex organisation. Investors, therefore, have avenues to hire managers, whereas 
managers have opportunities to engage investors to finance their projects. 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983b) (Uliana, 1989) (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) 
• Economies of Scale , 
The capital required to take advantage of economies of scale may be too large for one 
individual, or small group of individuals. It may be more efficient to have a large number 
of residual claimants investing in large firms. When the size ofthe risk to be born is 
large, it is advantageous to have a number of residual claimants among whom the risk is 
spread (Smith and Jensen, 1985). -
The stated advantages are not exhaustive and a number of other advantages exist in 
separating ownership and control (Smith and Jensen, 1985) (Uliana, 1989) (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). In order for there to be a truly advantageous 
shareholder/manager relationship, it is imperative that the advantages associated with the 
separation of ownership and control outweigh the costs of maintaining the agency 
relationship (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
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Conclusion 
This histori~ pe~spective of the firm and the theory associat~d with the development of . the firm, h1ghhghts the advantages of the modem corporatiOn and the reasons for its 
evolution. The firm was seen as an efficient form ofbusiness ownership which allowed 
owners of limited sources of capital the ability to extend their operations without 
necessarily increasing their own capital contributions. 
Along with its unquestionable advantages, the development of the modern corporation 
has provided a number of disadvantages. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage and one that 
directly prevents the corporation, as a business entity, from realising its goal of producing 
efficiently, is the ability for the managerial class to exploit resources for their own benefit 
rather than for the corporation's. 
It is this very ability of managers to detract from the efficiency of the firm and the 
methods and structures that have evolved to prevent such exploitation, that this thesis 
analyses. Managerial excesses manifest themselves in a number of ways: unusually high 
salary payments, excessive perquisites, incorrect business decisions, such as buying of 
game parks or the sponsoring of golf days. · 
The following section deals with the forces that place pressure on managers to perform 
efficiently and the managerial monitoring systems that have evolved. 
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Section II· 
0 
Forces that Monitor Managers. · · 
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Introduction 
This section identifies the various methods that shareholders have at their disposal to monitor the agency relationship between themselves and their managers. There are 
occasions when the organisation of the relationship between managers and owners, no 
matter how well planned, breaks down. It is at these times when the forces that exert 
pressure on managers come into play. This section focuses on the forces which place 
pressure on management to perform efficiently and the managerial monitoring systems 
that have developed as a result of these forces. 
The four basic control forces as illustrated by Jensen (1994) are: the legal, political and 
regulatory system; the product and factor markets; the capital market and the internal 
control system of the company. 
The four forces defined by Jensen {1994) combine to discipline managers and ensure they 
perform to the best of their capabilities. The threat to managers is the potential that they 
might lose their jobs (Hill and Jones, 1992). This threat stems from the large amounts of 
human capital managers invest in an organisation. The greater the amount of human 
capital invested by management into an organisation, the stronger is the potential threat to 
the manager of losing his job. Managers are therefore driven to perform in order to 
maintain their employment. Managers realise that the loss of their job has an effect on 
their ability to earn in the future (Fama, 1980). Therefore, even if managers were not · 
satisfied with their current positions, the negative effects of dismissal would still ensure 
that managers perform to the best of their abilities until their work contracts have expired. 
In the managerial field reputation is very important. Therefore a dismissal and the 
resulting damage it causes a manager's reputation, can have a devastating effect on a 
manager's potential to earn in the future (Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalatos, 1995). 
The forces stated by Jensen {1994) exert pressure on managers. The pressure originates 
from the force's potential to dismiss management from their employment (Fama, 19801P 
is the intention of this thesis to discuss methods available to shareholders to monitor 
managers; as such, each potential force is viewed within the context of its availability to 
the shareholders. 
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2.1) Legal, political and regulatory system 
ln certain instances the s{are' s ai:nlny to intervene in managmg the corporation acts as a 
mechanism to ensure that firms run efficiently and managers are kept in check. This legal 
or state system of monitoring managerial behaviour is particularly strong in state owned 
enterprises, where mismanagement will lead to laws passed to dismiss managers either 
directly or through the deregulation of industries. In privately held firms the state can 
exert its legal force on management where it believes firms have underperformed and 
thus it can eliminate monopolies and outlaw certain contracts (mergers). The state thus 
has an influence on firms, especially large monopoly firms, and can at times force 
managers to perform in order to keep their employment (Roe, 1990) (Oliver, 1995) (Roe, 
1991). 
The state also plays a large role in firms where it has granted a licence. These firms owe 
their ability to operate in a limited market to the state. It is believed that in such firms any 
underutilisation of resources, especially managerial excesses, will be prevented, as the 
fear exists that the state might grant licenses to other firms. The cellular phone companies 
in South Africa are examples of opportunities where the state may intervene to stop 
managerial underperformances. It is feasible that in the event that the companies 
underperform, more licenses will be granted. This fear of state intervention ensures that 
managers do not abuse the situation and thus operate efficiently. 
There are, however, a immber of shortfalls associated with allowing the state to monitor 
managerial behaviour. The problem with the legal/political regulatory system is that it is 
far too blunt an instrument to handle the problems of wasteful managerial behaviour 
effectively (Jensen, 1994). A further limit to legal regulations is that the ordinary 
shareholder realistically has no quick and easy way of implementing this system to enable 
him to dismiss management. In the case where a minority grouping is so powerful as to 
force judicial action, the system is slow and cumbersome (Roe, 1991 ). Therefore 
although legal/political regulatory controls do exist, they seem to be out of reach of most 
shareholders. Management is pressured; however, it is a weak pressure, without any real 
authority or fear. 
A further problem with the legal/political regulatory system is that the legal controls are 
drawn up by lawmakers and as such represent the interests of the lawmakers. These 
controls may not necessarily be in what the shareholders believe are their best interests 
(Roe, 1991). A situation may develop where regulations are put into place to limit 
managerial behaviour. However, these regulations may have a greater negative impact on 
shareholder returns than if those regulations were not implemented. An example of such 
interference was evident in the USA. The Williams Act and other similar anti-takeover 
legislation was passed in order to prevent take-overs (Roe, 1991 ). The legislators, in an 
effort to form a more stable economic environment, made hostile take-overs extremely 
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difficult to execute. It can be argued that these laws, instead of adding to economic 
efficiency, detracted from the efficiency of the economy, as managerial monitoring was 
made harder to implement (Roe, 1991). 
Thus although the state has the ability .to monitor managers, it is doubtful whether this 
monitoring force actually increases shareholder wealth, but rather acts as a prevention 
mechanism to stop managerial excesses. 
2.2) Product and Factor Markets 
The second source of pressure is the pressure exerted on management from the product 
and factor markets. If a company is not able to supply a product that customers desire at a 
competitive price, then that company will not survive. The failure of the company will 
lead to managers being without employment (Jensen, 1994). Thus factor and product 
markets exert pressure on management (Scherer, 1988). Unfortunately for shareholders, 
by the time the factor and product market pressures are beginning to be felt by the finn, 
the firm is most often in severe financial distress. Therefore it would be unwise for 
shareholders to rely exclusively on factor and product markets to discipline their 
management, as although these markets do control mismanagement, they are slow to act. 
(Jensen, 1994) (Scherer, 1988) 
The control of the product and factor market is out of the hands of the shareholders and 
firmly in the hands of the customers and suppliers of a company. It is imperative that no 
matter what control shareholders use to discipline management, attention is paid to the 
signals emitted by the product and factor markets. 
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2.3) Capital Market Control and Insider Control 
'11:;e last two mca.s..;.res ofconi:rv~, ~~;.;.r.:clj c::tpi•~i fil..u· • ..:;;t .:.ui~d01 ~··oursider control") and 
.. insider control, rest firmly in the hands of the shareholders. These two forces form the 
basis of the managerial monitoring systems and the foundations ofthe three models listed 
by Gerson ( 1992), as defined earlier in this thesis. 
The pressure exerted by capital markets is mostly dependent on outside shareholders or 
minority shareholders within a company (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). These shareholders 
rely on an efficient capital market to price equities correctly. In such markets poor 
management will result in the stock price ofthe finn dropping to attractive levels for 
outside management teams to purchase the company (Manne, 1965) (Davis and Stout, 
1992). Take-over bids are mounted and poor management teams are replaced with better, 
more efficient teams, which attempt to tum the performance of the company around at a 
handsome profit (Franks and Mayer, 1990). 
The outsider system thus relies on competition amongst management teams, as without a 
competing team to attempt a take-over, this system is rendered ineffective. The greater 
the competition between managers, the quicker action can be taken to dismiss poor 
management, as replacements are easily available (Fama, 1980). If no managerial 
replacements exist and the finn's managers are running the finn exceptionally poorly, it 
may be expected that some of the shareholders will fulfil management's role (Fama, 
1980). 
The internal control system relies heavily on current shareholders to take actions to 
prevent poor management (Roe, 1990). Unlike the force of the capital markets, where the 
onus to correct management falls on the market as a whole, the internal system places the 
onus to discipline management on the shoulders of the current shareholders (Franks and 
Mayer, 1990). 
Shareholders therefore have two alternative options at their disposal to discipline 
management. The one method is to make use of the capital markets and outside 
shareholders (outsider system); this method relies on an efficient capital market as well as 
a competitive market for managers. The alternative is for current owners of a company to 
discipline their management themselves (insider system); this system relies on the 
owners, who through the workings of group structures, ensure that managers perform. 
The following is a brief definition of each system and illustrates the major differences of 
various aspects of each system. 
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2.3.1) The Outsider system 
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among a large number of individual and institutional investors. This system r~lies ·on the 
invisible hand of the stock market and·the market for corporate control to discipline 
managers (Buzzachi and Colombo, 1996). Shareholders are responsive, flexible and 
mobile. Faced with a problem, they tend to act quickly (Breeden, 1993). 
The United States is perhaps the best proponent of the outsider system (Bhide, 1994). The 
system is often referred to as an Anglo-Saxon system of financial control, as the USA and 
UK represent the best examples of the system (Kester, 1993). The USA authorities have 
devised a number of rules and regulations that protect investors and promote market 
efficiency and liquidity (Roe, 1991) (Roe, 1990) (Bhide, 1994). These regulations 
highlight the importance that the capital market holds in such a system. All shareholders 
receive equal access to information and stringent disclosure and insider trading rules exist 
in order to protect smalJ shareholders from being exploited by large dominant 
shareholders (Franks and Mayer, 1990). The entire USA economy has evolved around 
these regulations. The regulations ensure that the economy is dominated by the outsider 
system and eliminate any chance of an insider type system developing (Bhide, 1994 ). 
2.3.2) Insider system 
The "insider system", in contrast to the outsider system, is characterised by the ownership 
of individual firms being concentrated in the hands of a small number of other firms, 
banks and families (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). Cross-shareholdings between firms are 
common place and the controlling shareholdings are retained within the corporate sector. 
The insider system has a more institutionally-based focus, with shareholders being 
smaller in number but larger in size than shareholders in the outsider system (Dickerson 
et al, 1995) (Porter, 1992). 
Whereas the outsider system stresses the importance ofthe efficient market (Manne, 
1965) and strongly protects the small shareholder, the insider system favours large 
shareholders, often at the expense of the efficient market (Prowse, 1990) (Yoshikawa, 
1995) (Aoki and Kim, 1995). Large shareholders are encouraged to form close ties with 
managers. These relationships allow the shareholders to be privy to price sensitive 
information before the information is released to the markets. Inasmuch as the outsider 
system favours the small shareholders, the insider system favours the large shareholders. 
27 
The striking feature of the insider system is the formation ofbusiness groupings. These 
groupings are economic entities composed of a set of judicially independent firms 
connected through equity linkages that jointly guarantee common control over all group 
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acknowledged, but they are present in Japan, Continental Europe and South Africa 
(Buzzachi and Colombo, 1996) (Gerson, 1991). These large corporate groupings manage 
the agency problems associated with a professional management class. It is the corporate 
group that ensures managers are kept in check and perform. Whereas the outsider system 
relies on the markets to ensure that managers execute their tasks optimally, the insider 
system relies on the workings of a large corporate group to ensure managerial 
competence. 
The rationale for the formation of group structures is generally quite different from the 
rationale for the acquisition of companies in a conglomerate. Conglomerate structures can 
be explained as the result of agency problems that arise from attenuated monitoring, 
rather than as an attempt to resolve those problems. Conglomerates tend to be less 
successful than group structures and are believed to be manifestations of managerial 
power. They represent a break down in the outsider system, rather than the effective use 
of the insider system (Grundfest, 1990). The insider system is developed to limit 
managerial excesses and prevent managers from misappropriating power, whereas 
conglomerates are generally formed out of the misappropriation of managerial power. 
2.4) Differences between the Insider and Outsider system 
The differences between the two systems will be illustrated on a global level with 
examples from a number of countries being used to emphasise certain characteristics of 
each system. It must be noted that each system varies from country to country and as such 
the two systems may be operating differently in South Africa to the manner in which they 
operate in the USA or Japan. This point does not detract from the analysis, as the 
essential characteristics of each system are still clearly visible in the South African 
context. 
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2.4~1) Contracting 
The nature and culture of the people within a country dictates to a large extent the manner 
in which business contracts are drawn ·up (Kester, 1993 ). This factor would therefore play 
a role in determining whether a country embraced an insider or outsider managerial 
monitoring system. Countries such as Japan and Korea, which rely on a set of moral 
codes and place a high premium on trust, tend to rely on the insider system of control. 
Insider contracts are often no more than "legal boilerplates" which specify parties are 
entering into a commercial relationship (Kester, 1993) (Internet, 1996); thus the insider 
system with its informal handshake agreements provides the perfect setting for such 
cultures. Conversely, contractual parties in the outsider system take pains to ensure that 
contracts are highly discrete and specify precisely the obligations of all concerned. The 
contract itself defines party obligations and no room is left for any ambiguity between the 
parties. The high specification set that the system demands is evidence of the scepticism 
that exists between the parties to an arrangement (Kester, 1993). Therefore countries such 
as the USA, where the nature of society is less trusting, would tend more towards an 
outsider system of monitoring. 
The extensive reliance of the insider system on implicit contracting ensures that a system 
of trust must develop not only amongst employees of single companies, but also among 
the top executives of the industrial groups (Internet, 1996). Trust is engendered in a 
number of ways: for example, the Japanese employ a system oflifelong employment 
which relies on the hiring ofmanagement straight from university (Internet, 1996). 
Managers are discouraged from leaving the company by a reward system that makes it 
attractive to remain with a single company. The insider system focuses on fostering 
loyalty and trust between managers and the company (Johnson, 1993). 
The greater loyalty and trust of the insider system allows its contracts to remain as 
flexible as possible. This flexibility, mutual trust and shared expectation enables 
companies to make rapid, informal and highly refined adjustments in order to preserve 
the spirit and substance of a business agreement, rather than merely the letter of a written 
contract. The flexibility of implicit contracting promotes the longevity of commercial 
relationships and enables the industrial groupings to adopt far sighted strategies, rather 
than focusing on the pure contract agreement (Kester, 1993). 
The maintenance of implicit contracts and long term relationships is further enhanced by 
reciprocal shareholding arrangements. Examples of such relationships are visible in the 
Japanese, German and the South African economies (Johnson, 1993). The equity 
ownership of major companies in an industrial group is frequently concentrated in the 
hands of group members or financial institutions with long standing relationships with the 
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group. Accompanying many of these holdings is the implicit understanding that group 
equity holders will not sell shares in the group (Kester, 1993). 
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unable to mature in an outsider system. The very nature of the outsider system prevents 
shareholders from forming any close links with managers. Managers and shareholders of 
firms in the outsider system tend to regard each other with suspicion. This alienation is 
visible in the lengthy and explicit contracts that dominate the outsider system. These 
allow all parties to the contract the feeling of security that the stipulated agreements will 
be performed (Porter, 1992) (Kester, 1993) (Grunfest, 1990). 
Perhaps the reason for this mistrust in the outsider system is to be found in the use of 
take-overs as a method to displace underperforming management. Take-overs undermine 
contractual relations between investors, managers and employees (Grundfest, 1990). 
It seems that the very mechanism on which the outsider system relies for its efficiency, 
namely the take-over, detracts from its ability to form long lasting contracts. 
Managers weary of the possibility that they can be replaced at any time, will not be 
prepared to forego current earnings for long term research and development projects. 
Companies maximise current profits, even if this approach sacrifices the potential for 
increases in future long-term profits (Breeden, 1993). 
The outsider system may therefore suffer from "short termism" - an inability to sustain 
long term investments. It is suggested that short termism is a reflection of contractual 
failures in the outsider system that is to a large extent brought on by the take-over process 
(May~r and Franks, 1990) (Aoi, 1993 ). 
A number of companies are simply unable to grow in a climate dominated by short 
termism. Examples exist of companies listing on stock exchanges and then delisting soon 
after as a result ofthe short-term focus of the capital markets. In the U.K. where the 
markets are efficient and an outsider system is firmly in place, a number of companies 
have delisted in the last two years with the reasons given that the market simply did not 
understand the long-term effects of the company's investment decisions. The Body Shop 
is just one example of a company which de listed in 1995 with the reason given by its 
owner, Annita Roddick, that the market suffers from "chronic short terrnism" (Vander 
Weyer 95). 
The insider system, with its steadier set of contracts and shareholders, affords companies 
time to implement strategies and promote their ideas. Companies are given more freedom 
to invest in research and development projects and pursue long term goals (Franks and 
Mayer, 1990). This point will be worth investigating in section 4, when the sample sets of 
this study are defined. It is to be expected that companies operating under the insider 
system will operate in sectors where large amounts ofResearch and Development are 
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needed. The outsider system companies should operate in sectors where short-term 
results can be easily identifiable. 
There seems to be a trade-off between the two different methods of correcting managerial 
failure (Margel and Singh, 1993).The outsider system, with its use of take-overs, may 
result in a higher level of managerial correction, but only at the expense of long term 
investments. The insider system fosters an atmosphere conducive to promoting long term 
investments; however, this is created at the expense of a high level of managerial 
correction (Franks and Mayer, 1990). 
2.4.2) Equity and Debt Markets 
The efficient working ofthe capital market is the cornerstone of the outsider system 
(Franks and Mayer, 1990). Without efficient capital markets, potential take-overs can 
never take place, as would-be purchasers could never properly evaluate the true worth of 
companies (Franks and Mayer, 1990}. The insider system relies much less on capital 
markets, as the need for managers to be disciplined via the workings of the market does 
not exist. The tight holding of insider-company stocks helps to render the threat of a 
potential market take-over useless (Aoki and Kim, 1995). Stock markets receive varying 
amounts of attention, depending on the system in which they operate. 
2.4.2.1) Outsider 
The outsider system relies heavily on liquid equity markets that are as efficient and fair as 
possible (Aoki and Kim, 1995). The flaw with the outsider system is that it tends to 
promote efficient equity markets and investor protection at the expense of good 
governance (Bhide, 1994). The rules that protect investors and the integrity of the stock 
market tend to foster antagonistic, arms length relationships between shareholders and 
managers (Bhide, 1994). 
In theory, market liquidity makes it easier for investors to diversify their risks and thus 
reduces the cost of capital for companies. The outsider system does afford shareholders 
the opportunity to diversify their stock portfolios. The problem is that rules which protect 
investors drive a wedge between shareholders and managers. Instead ofyielding long-
term shareholders that concentrate their holdings in a few companies, the laws have 
promoted diffused, arm's length stockholding (Aoi, 1994 ). Market liquidity itself 
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weakens incentives to take an active role in a company's performance. The free-rider 
problem prevents shareholders with a small stake in a company from exerting their own 
personal efforts to promote company performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), the reason 
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shareholder responsible (Bhide, 1994). 
The liquid market creates shortsighted stockholders who can easily sell their stock 
(Bernstein, 1993). Thus in times when companies face crises, short sighted stockholders 
are quick to sell their holdings and salvage as much wealth for themselves as possible. In 
illiquid markets, shareholders cannot easily sell their stocks and are forced to pull 
together to solve problems. Thus shareholders are given a cheap exit in liquid markets 
(Bhide, 1994). 
2.4.2.2)Take-overs 
The outsider system relies on markets for corporate control to discipline management 
(Franks and Mayer, 1990). The capital market (Manne, 1965) and the managerial market 
(Fama, 1980) act as conduits for change and supply necessary vehicles through which 
incumbent managers can be swiftly removed and easily replaced. 
Potential management teams monitor companies via the capital market. If companies are 
poorly managed, their stock prices will reflect the incompetence of the management team 
and will be lowly valued. Potential managers, realising that the company is undervalued 
and that the potential exists to tum the company around, will attempt to buy out the 
current stockholders, assume ownership of the company and fire the existing managers. 
This threat of take-over is a strong influence in ensuring managers perform (Franks and 
Mayer, 1990). The underperformance ofmanagement will result in their company being 
underpriced and therefore becoming a likely take-over target. Take-overs define the 
outsider system and epitomise the fluid workings of a market based system which relies 
on market forces to induce efficiency (Franks and Mayer, 1990). 
Henry Manne (1965, pp 113) first emphasised the importance of the market for corporate 
control on managerial performance. 
"Only the take-over scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among 
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast 
numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders." 
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In principle, ownership changes should allow assets to be employed in their most 
productive activity. Take-overs permit those who attribute the highest value to running a 
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managerial failure. They ensure that only those who are able to achieve the highest l~vel 
of productivity and lowest costs of production remain in control of organisations. (Franks 
and Mayer, 1990). 
The argument against the outsider systems is that the threat of take-overs can lead to 
welfare losses to society. In a climate of potentially hostile take-overs, the incentive to 
invest in long-term relationships between management and employees may be reduced, 
since there is a high probability that at some time in the future they may be broken. The 
outsider system of diffuse ownership and potential take-overs leads to an inability to 
make pre-commitments. This inability may have an adverse impact on the strategy of the 
firm's investment decisions. Firms may be forced to invest in short term projects that in 
the long run are less productive. 
2.4.2.3) Insider Markets 
Capital markets operating in the insider system are shallow and may not reflect the true 
value of shares. The high concentration of ownership and stable share holdings do not 
allow the equity markets to accurately evaluate companies. This factor detracts from the 
equity market's ability to serve as a conduit for companies to raise new capital (Aoki and 
Kim, 1995). · 
The equity market control so prevalent in the outsider system is rendered useless in the 
insider system, as companies are protected by stable shareholdings and a capital market 
that is both illiquid and inefficient (Aoki and Kim, 1995). The insider system places a 
great deal of emphasis on the debt market as a source of raising finance (Johnson, 1993). 
Financial intermediaries such as banks and other types of investment houses, take on 
added importance in the insider system, due mainly to their ability to loan funds to 
companies in need (Johnson, 1993). 
One of the reasons why the equity markets assume a less important role in the insider 
·system is the fact that the insider system creates a certain harmony among debt and equity 
holders. This is achieved by combining the two classes; joint equity and debt positions 
are held by the investors (Yoshikawa, 1995). Countries such as Japan and Germany see 
the biggest debt holders, being the largest equity holders. It is not unusual in these 
economies to witness shareholders i:!r:d d~btho1ders assuming each others roles (Prowse, 
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1990). This commingling of debt and equity holders allows insider firms to compensate 
lenders less. This is achieved as the mistrust which develops between these two 
stakeholders in the outsider system is nullified. as the stakeholders are effectively one 
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avoided and stakeholders are able to be more focused on what is best for the company, 
rather than what is best for themselves (Prowse, 1990). 
Commingling of stakeholders also has an effect on the finn in the times of hardship or 
near bankruptcy. The mixing of positions makes it easier for companies to be rescued 
from financial distress (Grundfest, 1990). Stakeholders are said to own strips ofthe 
company (Grundfest, 1990). These strips combine an equity and debt portion together 
and thus the conflict of interests which might arise between debt and equity holders when 
a company is liquidated, is avoided. Companies are in a position to have more freedom in 
their ability to continue trading in times of adversity (Grundfest, 1990). This ability to set 
aside the traditional stockholder-debtholder conflict is seen as a considerable advantage 
of the insider system. 
2.4.3) Disclosure 
The contractual nature of the outsider system ensures that such a system places a high 
premium on information disclosure. Equal access to information for all shareholders is 
seen as an important aspect of the system. The outsider system, through its rigid 
regulations, prevents shareholders from forming any close links with managers {Bhide, 
1994). Diffuse shareholders who own only small quantities of a company's equity are 
numerous and can not establish any meaningful contact with senior executives. In turn, 
senior executives are hampered from sharing any sensitive information with shareholders 
and are forced to conceal strategic information from them. Disclosure announcements 
and signals from management therefore become the only manner in which managers can 
inform shareholders of the company's performance {Whittington, 1993). The system 
relies on disclosure laws to ensure that shareholders are infom1ed about company related 
specifics as comprehensively as possible {Bhide, 1994); this disclosure helps investors 
make informed decisions and promotes the efficiency of the market. It is through proper 
disclosure that a number of potential investors are able to judge the true worth of a 
company. Thus proper disclosure facilitates likely take-overs, which in turn ensures that 
managers are kept in check. 
The declaration of dividends therefore takes on an added importance in the outsider 
system. Dividends not only represent an important source of income to investors, but take 
on further importance in their signalling value. Dividends can be seen as a very important 
tool which managers c::m utilise to sign2.l to the mar:(et comp~n;y specific information and 
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intentions. Thus dividends assume an important role in the outsider system. In the insider 
system where signalling plays a much less important role, dividends assume less 
importance (Johnson, 1993). 
The need for explicit disclosure is not as great for investors operating in the insider 
system (Porter, 1992). Insider companies are generally owned by a small number of 
shareholders. These owners take an active part in the managing of the company and are 
mostly aware of company performance and strategy. The system therefore relies less on 
managerial signalling, as stockholders have opportunities to talk on a far more personal 
level to managers (Porter, 1992). 
The insider system, with its greater scope for personal discussions, allows company 
strategies to be discussed in quiet meetings, free from public disclosure (Breeden, 1993). 
Managers are monitored by insiders with representation on the board; this nullifies the 
need for extensive disclosure, as the necessary monitors have full access to valuable 
information. Thus whereas the outsider system relies on the efficient disclosure 
regulations to ensure companies are properly monitored, the insider system places little if 
any importance on such disclosure regulations. 
2.4.4) Managers 
The two systems exert different pressures on managers. Each system uses a different 
approach. 
The outsider system forces managers to take cognisance of the strong capital markets, 
where the real threat of a take-over is a constant reminder to managers to perform or face 
dismissal. The insider system provides managerial autonomy and managers are protected 
from the restraints of short-term capital markets (Johnson, 1993). Incumbent managers 
are favoured in the insider system, whereas the outsider system favours management 
teams that compete amongst each other in contests for corporate control (Grundfest, 
1990). 
The stable intragroup shareholdings of the insider system ensure that take-overs can 
never occur and managers are firmly entrenched. While the entrenchment of management 
has its negative aspects, in certain cases it may be desirable. The long term success of 
implicit contracting which is founded upon trust relationships, depends critically on 
preserving continuity of management at the trading interface. As Schleiffer and Summers 
(1988, pp ) stated: 
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shareholders will find it value maximising to seek out and train individuals who are 
ca~al-,!e of commitment tn ~tr:zkef,u·'P'=''"~ qTqvate thpm to mar:a~Pment and P"'trench them. 
The insider system relies on a small, select circle of executives who run the large 
industrial groupings. The tight circle provides a potentially effective, even if informal, 
information network. Executives often serve on a number ofboards and the interlocking 
directorships narrows the scope for hidden actions and magnifies the adverse reputation 
effects of opportunistic behaviour (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1993). The insider system has a 
closed nature towards its managers and mangers are placed under much less public 
scrutiny regarding their decisions than those managers in the outsider system 
(Breeden, 1993). The outsider system facilitates openness and accountability for managers 
who are given the responsibility ofrunning public corporations (Breeden,1993). The 
system encourages a great number of managers to attempt to run companies and gains 
efficiency from the number of management teams competing to ensure that companies 
are run at their most efficient level. 
The problem of managers shirking their responsibility is not unique to any one system. 
Both systems devise methods to measure managerial behaviour and ensure such 
behaviour is kept in check (Kester, 1993). The agency problem is addressed in the insider 
system through extensive mutual monitoring and early selective intervention when 
performance falters (Kester, 1993). The outsider system relies on the capital market to 
ensure that managers do not underperform (Porter, 1992). 
In the insider system the board of directors of each company in the industrial grouping 
serves a vitally important safeguard through its monitoring and control activities. Unlike 
the boards of companies that operate in an outsider system, the boards of the insider 
system tend to mirror the company's most important long-term stakeholders. It is not 
uncommon to find banks and other major providers of capital well represented on the 
boards of Swedish, Japanese and German companies (Roe, 1991) (Prowse, 1990). 
The boards of the outsider system tend to be split between inside executive directors and 
outside directors with some special expertise, but no substantial capital stake in the 
company. The composition of the insider board allows the board to understand and 
appreciate the company's contractual relationships with its major stakeholders (Porter, 
1992). 
The insider system has no real disciplining mechanism for its managers. If firms 
underperform, the major stakeholders send in their best managers to turn the company 
around. A team effort is attempted, with established managers learning from the 
dcsign~ted advisors. The established managers nre then reinstated and allowed to manage 
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the firm. It is very rare that a real dismissal takes place. This extra security that the insider 
system affords managers is believed to spur managers on to perform. In return for having 
their job security. it is :::.s~u;::-e':i th::!t managers will voluntarily increase their effcrts and 
coramitmem :.o th~ cvmc<!n ·•, rcsi..li;:in;r in hi:.::;i.:r crodu.::tiv itv and higher returns to the 
• .. - - .c J 
shareholders in the long run. There is, however, the possibility that management assured 
of employment may become lazy and work less (Internet, 1996). 
This possibility is strictly limited in an outsider system, where the system prospers on 
dismissing underperforming managers. The outsider system is far more robust in its 
dealings with managers, and attempts to ensure that only the best managers are running 
·the company. 
Summation 
The outsider system favours economies where vast pools of managerial talent are 
available. In order for the system to succeed it is imperative that a large and competitive 
market exists for managerial skills. This ensures that managers are always compelled to 
perform efficiently or else face the possibility of being replaced by other management 
teams. The insider system favours economies where large reserves of managerial skills 
are not available. The system relies on a stable set of managers performing. 
2.4.5) Linkages 
It is important that the linkages of the above characteristics of each system be understood. 
The outsider system relies on strict, stipulated contracts. A general atmosphere of 
scepticism is present in most business contracts and this is evident in the 
manager/shareholder relationship. The system therefore promotes full disclosure. The 
disclosure serves as a signal to shareholders who do not have opportunities to build 
relationships with managers. The disclosure also contributes to the essential workings of 
the efficient market. The efficient market is the key to the outsider system disciplining 
management. Through the workings of the efficient market, potential take-overs can 
occur. Managers are therefore forced to perform, or else be replaced by new management 
teams. 
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Shareholders have opportunities to easily diversify their portfolios and are able to buy 
and sell on liquid markets at low transaction costs. Shareholders have short time 
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are discouraged. 
The insider system promotes contracts of trust. Shareholders usually invest large sums in 
one company and therefore are not able to easily divest. It is the shareholders who 
discipline management and the workings ofthe capital market are therefore not needed to 
discipline management. The necessity for disclosure is eliminated, as no efficient market 
is needed and shareholders gain access to sensitive information through their 
relationships with managers. Shareholders have long time expectations and do not simply 
invest to make a short-term profit. 
The following diagram presents a summary of the differences between the insider and 
outsider system in a table format. 
Summary Table 
SYSTEM COMPARISONS 
INSIDER SYSTEM OUTSIDER 
SYSTEM 
Contracts Loose I Unspecified I Based on trust Strict I To the law I Based 
on mistrust 
Shareholders - Small number of shareholders Large number of 
shareholders 
- Highly concentrated ownership Ownership patterns 
dispersed 
- Each shareholder owns large percentage of stock Shareholders own small 
percenta_g_e of stock 
Equity - Not much focus Large focus 
Market - Illiquid and inefficient Liquid and efficient 
Disclosure 
-
No stringent regulations needed Stringent regulations in 
place 
Discipline - Through group structures Through take-over market 
Management 
Shareholder/ - Close ties built over lengthy time frame Distant relationship I short 
Manager time frame 
Relationship 
Dividends - No real importance Assume significant 
importance (signalling) 
j Investors -Long time !Tame . Short time rrame 
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2.4.6) Summation: 
The two systems may reflect basic differences in the manner in which large corporations 
are perceived. The insider system views the corporation as an institution with personality, 
character and aspirations of its own. Its objectives encompass the interests of a wide 
range ofstakeholder groups: investors, employees, suppliers, customers and managers, 
but cannot be equated with any of them. The corporation is therefore perceived as a social 
institution with public responsibilities. The outsider system views the corporation as a 
private rather than a public body, defined by a set of relationships between principal and 
agent. Shareholder-owners, too busy and too numerous to undertake the responsibility of 
managing companies themselves, hire salaried executives to manage their affairs 
(Internet, 1996). 
The outsider system is said to promote an amoral institution, with its professional 
managers or "hired guns", who pursue goals of measurable efficiency. The outsider 
system, which focuses on economic performance, directs energy and resources to 
achieving financial results which are easily measurable, as opposed to social goals 
(Mintzberg, 1984). The system has been criticised for its failure to align the interests of 
individuals, investors and corporations with those ofthe economy and nation as a whole 
(Porter, 1992). In contrast, the insider system promotes long term goals. The system does 
not focus solely on short term shareholder's profits and it is possible that in the short run 
profits will not be maximised (Internet, 1996). The longer-term approach ofthe insider 
system does, however, allow managers more freedom to manage companies in the short 
run. The advantage of this is that companies can perform better in the long run, as 
concentrated projects can be undertaken to ensure long-term results. The disadvantage is 
that managers may perform poorly, as they are not properly and timeously monitored. 
2.5) SELF SYSTEM 
At the beginning ofthis section shareholders were assumed to be given an option of 
deciding whether to choose the insider or outsider system. There is, however, a third 
option which shareholders may utilise to monitor managers. This option is referred to in 
this thesis as the "self system". · 
The "self system" relies on the shareholders running their companies themselves. 
Majority stakeholders manage companies in which they have invested large portions of 
their own personal wealth. The managers, as shareholders, will ensure that the company 
is run efficiently and care is taken to maximise shareholder wealth. 
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The "self system" is similar in its workings to the insider system. Whereas the insider 
syste~ _relies on group formations to take up large equity stakes and monitor managers, 
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the potential market threats \Vhich ensure that managers are monitored in the outsider 
system. It is the owners' personal wealth and reputation which is the driving force behind 
the success of companies being run under the self system. 
The self system does, however, leave minority shareholders at the mercy ofthe owner-
manager. Often owners may prefer certain prestige investments rather than investing in 
the most profitable investments. Sport sponsorships and luxurious office blocks are just a 
few of the investments owner-managers may insist on. The minority shareholders have no 
real power to prevent the owner-managers from investing in these investments, other than 
to disinvest. The effective disciplines of the outsider system with its take-over markets 
are nullified, as owners have majority stakes and are immune to take-over forces. 
It is therefore conceivable that the owner-manager will make decisions that are 
favourable to himself, but which lower the value of the shares and thus afflict the 
minority shareholders. 
However, rational minority shareholders expect owner-managers to invest in projects that 
may not necessarily provide the greatest return. The minority shareholders therefore 
safeguard themselves by demanding a low subscription price when the managers turn to 
the capital markets for funds. The owner-manager thus directly bears the cost of not 
maximising the shareholder wealth. The loss to the owner-manager is in the lower offer 
price (Bergstrom arid Rydqvist, 1990). It is suggested that the discount ofthe offer is a 
reflection ofthe owner-managers reputation (Gerson, 1992). 
Owner-managers are therefore forced to own a large proportion of shares in a company. 
This large holding serves as a credible guarantee to minority shareholders that owners 
will not invest in underperfonning projects, since it is the owner himself who will be 
affected the most- on account of his large shareholding- by any investment decisions 
which cause the share prices to decrease (Bergstrom and Rydqvist, 1990). 
Owner-managers are thus forced to maximise shareholder wealth on account of their 
large personal holdings. Even if the owner hired additional managers, he would be forced 
to monitor their performance tightly, as any loss in efficiency would directly affect his 
own personal wealth. The self system, with its insistence that owners take on large 
holdings, eliminates any possibility that the owners would free-ride their responsibility as 
monitors. The free-riding that is dominant in the outsider system is therefore absent in the 
self system (Bergstrom and Rydqvist, 1990). 
The diagram below presents a graphical summary of Section 2: 
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The three systems closely resemble the three models listed by Gerson ( 1992) and which appear in the 
introduction of this thesis. The outsider force and the monitoring system that has evolved from this force 
can be equated to Model I. The shareholdings of such a system are widely dispersed and the capital market 
forces are relied upon to monitor managers. The insider force relies upon two different forms of pressure to 
monitor management. Both forces represent the original controllers of the firm and as such represent 
"insiders" which monitor management. The self system relies on families or small groups to monitor 
managers and as such can be equated to Model 2, whereas the insider force as defined in this thesis, relies 
on large corporate or financial groupings to monitor management (model 3). 
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2.6) Other Monitors of the Agency Problem 
Shareholders, as a stakeholder group of a company, do not necessarily have to be 
responsible for monitoring managers. Shareholders have the option of assuming the 
monitoring role or passing the burden of monitoring over to another stakeholder of the 
firm (Prowse, 1990). 
J 
Often debt is used as a conduit by shareholders to move the onus of monitoring to the 
creditors. Jensen (1986) argued that as debt ensures that the firm has to make periodic 
payments, it reduces the control managers have over the firm's cash flow and incentive 
for managers to engage in non-optimal activities. Grossman and Hart ( 1982) argued that 
the existence of debt forced managers to consume fewer perquisites and become more 
efficient. The greater efficiency lessened the probability of bankruptcy and the resulting 
poor reputation of managers. Debt does, however, have its price and the cost of debt is 
often felt by the shareholders themselves (Prowse, 1990)(Hoshi, Kashyap and 
Scharfstein, 1990). High levels of debt may subject the managers of the firm to make 
decisions that would not necessarily create the maximum value for the firm 
(Chenchuramaiah, Bathala, Moon and Rao, 1994) (Smith and Jensen, 1985). 
A firm that is carrying the burden of too much debt may be forced to cancel certain long 
term projects and focus on short term, less profitable projects, so as to meet its debt 
obligations. 
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Conclusion 
This section defmes the forces that monitor managers and the managerial monitoring 
systems which have evolved on account of these forces. Each force relies on a different 
pressure point to keep management in check. This thesis is only concerned with the 
forces which rely on the shareholders to monitor managers. Three systems were defined 
and it is these three systems which will be analysed to determine which system best 
monitors managers. Remembering that the thesis tends to perform its analysis in the 
South African context, it was felt that the most dominant monitoring system of the SA 
economy should be highlighted. 
The next section deals with the development of the insider system in SA and how it 
became the dominant system. 
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· -Section III 
The Development of 
S.A. Corporate Groupings 
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Introduction 
The previous section identified three structures which. shareholders could choose from in order to discipline management. It is the intention of this section to discuss the 
structures that have developed in the SA economy and the reasons for their development. 
While it is not within the scope ofthis thesis to explain the entire history of the South 
African economy, it is felt that an outline ofhow corporate groups evolved in S.A. is 
necessary to enable the reader to fully place the study in context. 
The South African economy has over the years been dominated by a small number of. 
very large firms. As Savage (1987, pp28) commented: 
All available evidence points to a mounting concentration of economic resources, a more 
concentrated pattern of ownership of these resources, and a growing centralisation of 
significant economic decision making in fewer hands. In short, there is an increasing 
pattern of concentration of economic power in South Africa. However it is measured, 
South African economic life is becoming more dominated byfewer firms, fewer 
significant owners and fewer decision makers. 
Savage, 1987,pp28 
There is a large amount of evidence that suggests that the South African corporate 
landscape is dominated by five or six large, diversified groups of companies (Botha, 
1994). The table below was extracted from Mcgregor's(1996) and clearly demonstrates 
the control these large corporations have. 
45 
t-jistory oi u(oup \;OfHroHed ~ompanJc;.s 
Quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(based on market capitalisation) 
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Percentage Total Control of the Market c apitahsation of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
Controlling 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Body 
Anglo 44.2 42.4 33.7 38.2 43.3 40.5 
American 
Sanlam 13.2 13.2 15.6 12.0 10.5 12.8 
Rembrandt 13.6 15.2 14.6 15.5 13.0 10.3 
SA Mutual 10.2 10.4 14.2 10.7 9.7 8.9 
Liberty 2.6 3.7 4.7 6.2 7.2 6.0 
Top Five Groups Control(%) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
83.8 84.9 82.8 82.6 83.7 78.5 
1996 
37.1 
12.4 
7.8 
11.2 
7.3 
1996 
75.8 
The reasons for the severe concentration of economic power in South Africa may be 
found to a large extent in the policies which the South African, Nationalist Government 
followed (Savage, 1987, p10). The policy of Apartheid led the international community 
to adopt certain restrictive practices in their dealings with South Africa and South African 
ftrms (Uliana and Cohen, 1990). Many international companies withdrew their 
investments from South Africa (Bhana, 1987). 
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The international disinvestment from S.A., which was used as a weapon by foreign 
countries to change the Apartheid policy (Bhana, 1987), left a chasm in the S.A. economy 
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further exacerbated the already tight concentration of S.A economic power (Financial 
Mail, 1995). · 
Large South African companies had no real option but to invest in the opportunities 
which were created for them locally as a result of the foreign disinvestment from South 
Africa. The stringent exchange controls, coupled with the fact that a large number of off-
shore markets were closed to South African companies as a result of sanctions, afforded 
S.A. companies very little oppurtunity of investing in any markets outside the borders of 
South Africa. In a sense, the local opportunities provided much needed investment 
avenues for many of the larger S.A. corporates (Savage, 1987). Thus large SA companies 
began to divest locally into new areas ofbusiness, areas in which they had not previously 
operated. The powerful mining companies with their already strong infrastructure and 
relatively secure income streams, were ideally positioned to take advantage of these 
potential diverse investment opportunities (Savage, 1987). Another group of companies 
to take advantage ofthe investment opportunities were the South African mutuals (large 
insurance companies such as Old Mutual and Sanlam, which had a secure income 
stream). 
At more or less the same time international sanctions began affecting the South African 
economy. The economy experienced a shift in individual housing savings from 
conventional sources, such as banks, to mutual companies (Kantor, 1992). This provided 
the mutuals with large cash reserves and enabled them to invest in the opportunities 
created by the foreign withdrawals. Thus the mining houses and mutual companies 
formed the nucleus of the groupings currently present in South Africa. 
The S.A. Government policies also had a marked effect on the skilled professionals of the 
S.A economy. A·number ofS.A professionals emigrated in what has colloquially become 
known as the "Brain Drain". This draining of skilled professionals had an enormous 
effect on the pool of skilled managers. Only a limited number of skilled managers 
remained in the country (King, 1994) (King Report, 1994) and, as such, the market for 
managers which Fama (1980) described as being so important to control managers, was 
not very effective in the S.A economy (Uliana, 1988). 
The S.A. economy began to lean more and more towards the insider system of control. 
Large company groupings were established and these groupings began to effectively 
control the economy. Unlike the New York Stock Exchange, the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange did not outlaw the creation of pyramid structures (Barr Gerson and Kantor, 
1995). These structures further enhanced the ability of corporate ~oupings to control 
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companies. The pyramid structures allowed group owners to raise more capital without 
losing the required corresponding control. Thus groups became powerful and 
cn'·'Centration of control h-::<rr.e thzhter (Gerson. 1992). The S.A ec-0 ... n;y tl:e-ref0re 
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(Gerson, 1992). 
The South African corporate landscape came to be dominated by few directors sitting on 
a number of company boards (IGng, 1994). Many executives from the controlling 
companies sat on the boards of the companies which they controlled. It was found that 
86% of the top fifty companies interlocked at the directorate levels with one of the major 
fmancial institutions in the country (Savage, 1987). This interlocking of directors is 
typical of an insider system of monitoring. 
All the above developments in the S.A. economy were at the expense ofthe outsider 
system. The S.A. capital markets, through the withdrawal of many foreign investors and 
the ability of owners to issue shares without losing control (pyramid structures), became 
mostly ineffective as a means for controlling managers. The illiquidity in the market and 
the near impossibility of shareholders to execute hostile take-overs, due to the pyramid 
structures, rendered the capital market ineffective as a means of monitoring managers. 
This, combined with the lack of skilled managers in the S.A. economy, ensured that the 
ability of an outsider system to control managers was severely restricted. Large corporate 
groupings evolved which attempted to monitor their managers through the workings of 
the insider system. 
3.1) Group Structures 
The South African economy is dominated by five or six large diversified group 
companies. To define these corporate groupings as conglomerates is wrong. Gerson 
(1992) defined a conglomerate as a single defined company engaged in several unrelated 
fields of activity. Therefore some of the individual companies associated with the large 
groupings are indeed conglomerates, in that they operate in several unrelated fields. 
However the defining point of difference between conglomerates and groupings is: 
The Shareholders of a conglomerate all have the same pro rata claim to dividends in its 
various branches or subsidiaries. This condition is not met with respect to the various 
shareholders involved in the South African corporate groupings. 
Gerson 1992, p I 0 
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Another characteristic ofthe South African groupings is their size. All ofthe six 
groupings controlled at least two percent of the market capitalisation ofthe JSE at the 
Business groupings are by no means limited to the South African corporate environment. 
Groupings of one form or another are evidenced in countries such as Sweden, Japan, 
West Germany and Korea. Buzzachi and Colombo (1996, pp) defined corporate 
groupings as : 
Economic entities composed of a set of juridicia//y independent firms connected through 
equity linkages which jointly guarantee common control over all group assets. 
Gotto(l982) made a distinction between what he defined as A type associative groupings, 
typical of Japanese 4Keiretsu, and B type hierarchical groupings, which prevail in Europe. 
Gotto defined type A groups as those companies grouped around a predominant financial 
intermediary. In Japan type A groupings are formed around banks. Type B groupings are 
those groupings that are composed around large firms and their subsidiaries. An 
important difference between the two group structures is that members of type A groups 
are usually all large-scale firms, whereas type B groups consist mainly of only one large-
scale firm and its subsidiaries (Gotto, 1982). 
~ Large corporate group structures that developed in Japan. (Yoshikawa, 199 5) 
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3.2) The South African Corporate Groupings 
Gerson ( 1992) identified six large corporate groupings in South Africa. It is possible to 
divide the six groupings into type A and B groupings using Gotto's criteria. Type A 
groupings are those groupings which are formed around a predominant financial 
intermediary and type B groupings are those groups which are formed around a 
predominant company. 
Type A Groupings 
The South African type A groupings have predominantly been formed around large life 
insurance companies. The three groups are the Old Mutual, Sanlam and Liberty Life 
groupings. Both Old Mutual and Sanlam are mutual organisations and as such are not 
owned directly by shareholders; indirectly they are owned by their policyholders. Liberty 
Life, unlike Old Mutual and Sanlam, is not a mutual company and is a listed company 
owned by its shareholders. The Liberty Life Group was started by Donald Gordon in 
1958 and has rapidly become a large player in the South African economy. It is the 
youngest of the three companies, but has nevertheless quickly gained a large controlling 
block of JSE listed companies. 
Type B Groupings 
The type B Groupings have predominantly been started by a family or a coalition of 
families which formed a large company. These companies then grew and expanded and 
eventually industrial groupings were formed. The three main groupings are the 
Rembrandt, Anglovaal and Anglo American Corporation groups. The Anglo American 
Corporation was formed in 1917 by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer. The Rembrandt group was 
forme~1948 by Anton Rupert and Dirk Hertzog and these two families, Hertzog and 
Rembra~, are still very much in control of the group. The third and smallest ofthe three 
group'irigs is the Anglovaal group, founded in 1933 by the Hersov and Menell families. 
Both the Anglo American Corporation and the Anglovaal group were first established as 
mining companies and then later expanded to form the large industrial groupings that 
they are today (Gerso~ 1992). 
In general, group controlled companies are able to draw on a huge network of associated 
companies. In times of trouble it is not unusual for weak companies to be bailed out by 
some of their stronger siblings. An example of such a bailout is the manner in which the 
Anglo American group assisted O.K. Bazaars (1929) Limited ("O.K."), when O.K. was 
experiencing financial difficulty. O.K. was controlled by South African Breweries, which 
formed part of the Anglo group. The group, on seeing the poor performance of O.K., 
delisted its stock from the JSE and is currently attempting to restructure O.K. in order to 
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ensure it becomes profitable (SAB Financial Statements, 1994). Thus one of the group 
systems biggest drawbacks is highlighted. There are times when profitable companies in 
~1-.. r~ :-- ... _~:~ ~·:-e f\.rc~d ~a ln:;e :v-c~e:·~r. S."ue tc ~~eir atte~pts to -::.s~=s~ \Ve2.\e:-- ~tlb~~~1~:lr;es. 
This canoe aon~ (mough dlt!ap loans or sale of assets at below market rates (Oliver, 
1995). 
The unique structure of the corporate grouping allows the group to develop what has 
become known as an internal capital market (Bhide, 1993). The group formation allows 
the group to form an extra administrative layer. Managers report to a corporate or general 
office, rather than having to answer to their owners. The corporate office performs 
functions that would otherwise be executed by the external capital markets. These 
functions include the raising and distribution of capital for the many units of the group 
(Bhide, 1993). 
The insider capital market provides the group with the ability to handle sensitive data 
efficiently. Sensitive data is kept within the firm and prevented from falling into the 
wrong hands. The structure of the insider market may also allow managers the ability to 
act quickly and timeously on new projects. The insider system does, however, create 
certain disadvantages. The extra administrative layer results in higher overheads for the 
group companies. The insider market may also be slow to react, especially on changes to 
managerial decisions (Bhide, 1993). 
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Conclusion 
I t is interesting to note from the development of the South African monitoring systems, the marked influence that political developments have had on economic and financial 
decisions. It seems that the event which gave the South African insider system its greatest 
impetus was the apartheid era. Apartheid and the resulting economic actions which S.A. 
companies were subjected to, firmly entrenched the insider system of control within 
South African corporates. 
South Africa is certainly not the only country in the world which has embraced the 
insider system of control. Countries such as Japan, Germany and Sweden would all fit the 
mould of countries dominated by the insider system. 
It will, however, be interesting to observe, as the S.A. economy opens and begins to 
become more and more accepted by the international community, what effects these 
changes will have on the S.A. system of monitoring managers. 
It would be difficult to imagine a South African economy not controlled by Anglo 
American or Rembrandt. However, as times change and monitoring systems adapt, one 
may very well see the South African economy tum more to the outsider system of 
control. 
If one were to see a change in monitoring patterns, it would be a pre-requisite that the 
JSE become more of an effective tool in helping mount take-overs. For this to occur, the 
potential for companies to create pyramid structures would have to be eliminated and the 
JSE would have to become a far more liquid exchange. 
Currently in South Africa, as this chapter sets out, the majority of South African 
companies control their man~gers via the insider system. The exact ability of such a 
system to monitor accurately managerial behaviour, will be examined in the following 
sections ofthis thesis. 
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Introduction 
Section 2 identified three possible methods that. shareholders had at their disposal to diScipline managers. Each method relied upon a certain distinctive om1ership 
structure of a company in order to operate. For example, an outsider system relied upon a 
disperse shareholding structure, whereas the insider and self system relied on 
shareholders taking on significant, large, equity stakes in a company. 
Recalling that the lack of managerial monitoring results in a firm producing less efficient 
results, it is important for shareholders to ensure that managers are well monitored so as 
to gain the maximum returns from their investments. It is the objective of this thesis to 
analyse the effect that monitoring systems, which are determined to a large extent by the 
om1ership structure of a company, have on management. Ibis study attempts to define 
which managerial monitoring system produces the best retmn for shareholders. 
Ibis thesis is concerned with the ability of the managerial monitoring systems to create 
efficiency. This ability is in the systems adeptness to prevent managerial excesses. These 
excesses are manifest in the systems inability to produce shareholder returns. Thus the 
system which best prevents managerial excesses - and therefore monitors managers best -
is the one which ensures that shareholders receive the maximum return on their 
investment. 
Specific attention will be paid to the performances ofthe insider/group controlled 
companies. These large groups have recently come under pressure to discontinue. Many 
believe that they are preventing the South African economy from balanced development. 
The results from this thesis will add to the current debate as to whether these groups 
should be prevented from developing, or whether they indeed provide efficiencies in their 
ability to monitor managers. 
This section deals with the actual statistical study, methodology and hypothesis. It sets 
out the various group classifications and the assumptions related to the study. 
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4.1) Hypothesis 
The objective ofthe study, as stated above, is to determine which monitoring system 
monitors managers best. The study defmes companies into various groupings depending 
on the monitoring system which the companies employ. It is the company's ownership 
structure that directly influences the managerial monitoring system implemented by the 
company. Companies are divided into three distinct groupings, namely: Insider 
companies, Outsider companies and Self companies. 
The objective is to determine whether any ofthe monitoring systems monitors the 
managers more efficiently than the others. Using shareholder returns, the Null hypothesis 
is tested. 
The Null hypothesis is that: No monitoring system monitors managers differently to 
the other systems. 
The alternative hypothesis is that: One of the systems monitors managers differently 
to the others. 
Stated mathematically: 
Ho: Rglns = RgOut = RgSelf 
Ha: Rglns :t:. RgOut -:t: RgSelf 
Where R =The return to shareholders. This measure is defined as being the ·;· .. 
change in the market capitalisation of a company plus the dividends the company 
has issued. 
R= (MCI + 01) -MCO 
MCO 
MCl =The market capitalisation ofthe company at the end ofthe year. 
D 1 = The dividends issued in the year under review. 
MCO =The market capitalisation of the company at the beginning of the year. 
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And 
gins = The insider group. (See group definitions listed later in this section) 
gOut = The outsider group. 
gSelf= The self group. 
The study analyses the performance of the various companies over a five year period. The 
period is from Jan 1991 - Jan 1996. It was felt that a period of less than five years would 
not allow for any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the sample set. The period 
chosen represents the most recent five year period available. An analysis of a ten year 
period provided a very small sample set. The reason for this was that a large number of 
companies had changed their ownership structures over the period. The five year period 
thus provided sufficient duration and an adequate sample set to analyse. 
4.2) Assumptions 
4.2.1) The Objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth 
Perhaps the most important assumption ofthe study is that the objective of the fum is to 
maximize shareholder wealth. A debate currently exists in financial literature as to 
whether or not this assumption holds tnie. As Doyle (1994, pp5) stated: 
Currently the most intellectually respected business Qbjective is shareholder value. 
A number of other reputable finance texts such as Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (1993, 
p 18) and Copeland and Weston ( 1988, p20) agree with Doyle's statement and accept that 
the maximisation of shareholder wealth is the primary objective of the firm. 
It is argued, however, that the objective of firms maximising shareholder value is an 
objective which is valid only for firms operating in the outsider system, such as the USA. 
Such companies rely more on increasing shareholder value as opposed to companies 
operating in Japan, in the insider system, which appear to focus more on multiple goals, 
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weighting approximately equally market share, profitability and innovation (Dole, 1994, 
p4). 
In the South African context, a study conducted by Bosch and duPlessis (1982) found 
that 90% of South African executives believed that the primary objective of the firm was 
to maximise the rate of return on equity capital. A further South African study by Fasol 
and Firer (1995) found that 88% ofCEO's believed that it was management's primary 
responsibility to look after the interests of the shareholders. It therefore seems that this 
thesis's assumption that the objective of the finn is to maximise shareholder return is 
quite reasonable in the light of studies conducted in South Africa. 
4.2.2) The Return to Shareholder measure, as defined in the study, is an 
accurate measure of shareholder wealth 
It is assumed that the return to shareholder measure, as defined later in this section, 
accurately measl.rres shareholder wealth. A number of early American studies used non-
market measures to measure effects that changes in company ownership had on the finn 
(Oswald and Jahera, 1991). Measures such as net income; sales and owners equity were 
used. In a study conducted by Strickland, Wise and Zennet ( 1995) a number of measures 
were used to measure the efficiency of firms. Measures included the market value of 
equity, the book value of assets and total sales. The measure in this study is based on 
market returns to shareholders and is not effected by any accounting data. Companies are 
therefore all compared using the same measure. No room has been allowed for any 
accounting manipulation of the data. 
4.2.3) The ownership structure of the firm dictates the managerial 
monitoring system 
The study assumes that companies that have adopted comparable ownership structures 
monitor their managers in a similar fashion. Therefore companies with particular 
ownership structures are defin~d into specific groupings. It was assumed that the 
ownership structure of a company dictates the system that the company utilises to 
monitor its managers. 
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4.2.4) Debt used to assist in monitoring, not as an option to monitor 
It is this thesis's assumption that levels of debt are used in assisting shareholders to 
monitor managers, rather than as an option for shareho Iders to stop monitoring managers. 
The reason for this assumption stems from the practical difficulties of being able to gain 
information from companies that rely solely on debt to monitor their managers. These 
companies are usually unlisted companies and, as such, do not declare much company 
sensitive information. 
4.2.5) Control of a Pyramid is equivalent to control of company 
South African owners have been allowed to make use of a system of multi-tiered holding 
companies to ensure that the issue of new equity does not result in them losing control of 
their company's (Barr, Gerson and Kantor, 1995). This systemofpyramiding is used by 
owners once their equity stake in their company reaches the 50% mark. Instead of issuing 
and thereby relinquishing control, the owners simply vest their entire 50% holding into a 
holding company and then sell equity in the newly formed holding company. This 
process of equity dilution, or pyramiding, can theoretically continue indefinitely, 
provided investors are prepared to invest in the holding companies (Barr Gerson and 
Kantor,l995). · 
South African owners have therefore used a system of pyramid holding companies as a 
means to raise extra equity without yielding control. The pyramid structures, like dual 
class shares, break the link between the distribution ofthe shareholders voting power and 
their effective holding ofthe underlying equity (Barr and Gerson, 1994). 
For the purposes ofthis study the possible effects of this pyramiding are not discussed. In 
analysing the actual ownership structures of companies, it was assumed that if one group 
had obtained control over a pyramid and that pyramid had control over the underlying 
operating company, then the identifiable group had control over the operating company. 
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·4.3) Measures of the Study 
Following the stated assumptions, the following measures were used in determining the 
results of the study. These measures had to be defined in order to present a meaningful 
study. 
4.3.1) Return to Shareholder -Measure 
The measure is defined as the growth in the market capitalisation of the company plus the 
dividends issued by the company for a specific year. The use oft he growth of the market 
capitalisation of a company enables any complications which may arise due to share . 
splits and capitalisation issues, to be ignored. The measure effectively accounts for these 
changes in share capital, as it takes the total shares in issue and multiplies these by the 
price. Therefore, if a company had a share split, the total shares in issue would increase 
while the share price would decrease, thus eliminating any effect in the calculation. The 
same is true for the capitalisation issue. The _one problem that was encountered in using · 
the growth of the total market capitalisation as a measure, was when new shares were 
issued, such as a rights issue or an issue of shares for cash. In such a situation these 
shares were excluded from the calculation. using the end of the year share price. 
The revised R would therefore be stated as follows: 
R = (MC1 + Dl)- CMCO + NSl) 
MCO 
NS 1 =New shares issued in the year under review 
The information needed for the measure was acquired using the monthly JSE bulletins. 
The average share price of each firm for the month in January was used as the share price 
and it was multiplied by the number of shares in issue at the end of January . .£££b_y~ar 
was cal~ed and the difference between the year was used as the growth in the market 
capitalisatio~· of each company. January 1991 was used as the base year. The changes 
were then calculated as percentage movements over the base year. This ensured that any 
size effects which may have favoured larger companies, were effectively eliminated. 
' ,i'f'· 
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The dividends issued by the company were included in the companies total market 
capitalisation figure. Thus, when changes were analysed, they included all dividends 
issued. With the introduction ofSTC (secondary tax on companies), a large number of 
South African companies have begun to issue scrip dividends, either as an alternative to 
conventional dividends, or in place of conventional dividends. The issue of such 
dividends may have an effect on the shareholder returns for the year. In an attempt to 
standardise the study, all dividends were assumed to be issued as cash. This alleviated the 
problem of attempting to define which shareholders had chosen the cash dividend as 
opposed to th~ scrip dividend. 
4.3.2) Risk Measure 
Ideally, all firms should be identical apart from their control structures. This would allow 
the differences in shareholder returns to be absolutely explained by different control 
structures; however this is not the case. Companies operate in different sectors, have 
different capital structures and may even operate in different markets, such as local 
versus international; all these factors affect company performance. In aneffort to isolate 
the control structure effect, company returns were adjusted by their risk measure. 
R= [ (MCl + Dl)- ( MCO + NSl)] I Beta 1 
MCO 
Beta 1 =The risk weighting of the company as determined in the year under review. 
(Refer to group tables) The risk measure used in this study is the beta measure as defined 
by the Financial Risk Services (Bradfield and Bowie, 1992-1996). The beta measure is a 
measure of a company's returns when compared to the market as a whole, the systematic 
risk. It is therefore the correlation of a company's earnings with the performance ofthe 
entire market. The measure used correlated the company's performance to the 
performance of the overall market index. This may be the reason why the beta measures, 
as a whole are relatively low. The unique structure ofthe JSE, with its apparent division'. 
between the mining and industrial sectors, may result in the correlation between the 
industrial shares and the overall indices being relatively low. 
The insider companies may have been expected to have a much lower risk measure than 
the other two groupings. The structure of the insider companies and their close ties to the 
large South African groupings, allows the groupings to manipulate the earnings of the 
company and thus may lower the risk estimate of each company. The outsider and self 
companies do not have this opportunity to manipulate the earnings of their particular 
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companies. One would therefore expect the beta measures of these two samples to be 
greater than that ofthe insider sample. The average beta is calculated using the 
companies beta for each of the five years, adding them and then dividing the total by five. 
This is not a perfect measure to defme each sample's risk, but it does allow comparisons 
to be drawn of the risk between the vru:ious groupings. 
The average risk measure for the insider companies was 0.65, slightly lower than the 
measure for the outsider companies, which was 0.66, but quite a bit higher than the 
measure for the self companies, which was 0.51. The high risk measure of the outsider 
companies may have been expected, but the low measure of the self companies is 
surpnsmg. 
The disadvantage of using the average beta measure, as defined above, when calculating 
the risk estimate of each group, is that it does not weight the companies according to their 
size. Thus the risk estimates of small and large companies were treated in the same 
manner. When looking at the various categories collective average beta's, these measures 
may therefore be slightly distorted. The reason for the distortion is that instead of 
properly weighting each company's beta on the particular company's size in the 
grouping, all betas were treated equally. This non-weighting ofthe betas biased the 
average beta in favour ofthe betas of the smaller companies. This bias may be the reason 
for the somewhat unexpected results in the samples risk estimations.· 
4.3.3) The Concept of Control: 
The third measure that needed to be defined by the study was the measure of control. 
It was the concept of control that played a significant role in .the group definitions; this 
will be explained later in this section. Companies were divided into groupings based on 
their ownership structures. It was the ownership .structures that defined the ultimate 
controllers ofthe company. The controller of a company dictates what managerial 
monitoring ~ystem is to be utilised. In order to classify the groupings, a defmition had to 
be derived for control. 
Hunt ( 1986) concluded that the concept of control was the ability to select a company's 
board of directors. Smith (1976) in his study interpreted control of a company as the 
power to direct the affairs of the corporation. It was his belief that control does not 
necessarily" imply active decision making of the firm, but it implies the ability to make the 
more fundamental decisions of the firm, such as the selection of management. 
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In this study in order for an individual person, corporate grouping or any other coalition 
to be in control, it is implied that they are not afraid of market forces that can effectively 
destroy their power to run the firm. Therefore, ideally, any group which controlled more 
than 50% of a company's equity(voting rights), would be in control, as no matter what 
proportion of equity a rival bought on the market, he could never Mestle control from the 
group. In effect, the group had no fear of market forces, as their position of control was 
always assured. The 50% holding of equity was used by Gerson, Barr and Kantor (1992) 
as their measure of control, however the measure was felt to be too stringent for this 
study. 
In a study conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), they used a 20% equity holding as 
indicating control. The American system. as mentioned previously in this thesis, relies on 
very diffuse shareholdings and, as such, Dernsetz and Lehn believed that a 20% holding 
was sufficient to allow for effective control of a corporation. The 20% limit was felt to be 
too lax a measure for the South African economy and thus was not used as a measure in· 
this study. The S.A. Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) identified control as 30% of the 
voting rights of a company (SRP, 1991 ). The 30% measure is believed to be a reasonable 
estimate of control and this measure was used as defining control in this study.5 . 
As yet no definition exists in financial literature which spells out the precise amount of 
ownership that constitutes control over a corporation. Hunt ( 1986) reviewed the available 
data and revealed that no consensus exists over the amount of ownership which 
constitutes effective control ofthe corporation. Evidence supporting Hunt's view reveals 
that the amount of shares needed to attain control over a corporation may indeed be firm 
specific, change with shifts in ownership patterns and may indeed be unquantifiable by 
outside researchers (Uliana and Cohen, 1990). The 30% limit in this thesis is merely a 
benchmark and it is not the purpose ofthis thesis to define the exact percentage that is 
needed for contra I to be secured. 
5 The SRP changed the Definition in 1995 to 35%, however 30% was still used as the measure of control in 
this study. 
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4.4) The study 
In order to execute the objective of the study, namely to conclude whether or not a 
particular managerial monitoring system monitored managers differently to the rest, 
companies listed on the JSE were analysed. 
The sample of operating companies compiled for this study was confined to the Industrial 
Board ofthe JSE. The mining sector, which contnbuted approximately 10% ofthe 
country's gross domestic product and comprised 25%' of the JSE' s Actuaries Overall 
Index at the end of 1990 (Mathison and Hollidge, 1991 ), was excluded from the study. 
The omission was motivated by the fact that the mining companies have different 
dynamics of ownership and control to that of the industrial companies. Many of the mines 
are governed by very long term management contracts. These contracts create marked 
differences between the manner in which mining companies are owned, in contrast to the 
industrial companies (Gerson, 1992, p 19). 
The full sample ofthe study covered 337 firms listed on the Industrial Board ofthe JSE, 
which includes all sectors other than mining, property, property trusts and financial 
services. The industrial companies comprised 4 7% of the JSE Overall Index for the 1991 
year (JSE Monthly Bulletin, 1992). 
The studyanalysed companies over the same five year period (Jan 1991- Jan 1996) and 
thus any abnormalities which may have been caused by the changes in the economy were 
eliminated. All companies in the sample experienced the same general business 
conditions, as the period under review remained the same. 
4.5) Exclusion o(Firms 
A number of firms were excluded from the study and the reasons for their exclusions are 
listed as follows: · 
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4.5.1) Changes in Ownership Structure 
If a firm's ownership structure changed in such a manner that it no longer adhered to the 
stringent group definitions for any one year under the five that were studied, the firm was 
excluded from the sample set. 
4.5.2) Foreign Controlled Firms 
If firms were controlled by foreign companies or individuals, they were excluded from 
the sample set. Foreign companies have their own regulations which govern them 
(Uliana) and it was felt a comparison between South African controlled firms and foreign 
controlled firms would not result in the ability to draw fair conclusions. 
25 Foreign firms were identified in 1991 and excluded from the sample. 
4.5.3) "Mini" Groupings 
Group controlled firms are distinguished by their size. Each one of the six identified 
groupings controlled greater than 2.5% of the market capitalisation of the JSE. A number 
of smaller groupings were identified; these groupings were considered to be too small to 
utilise a system of insider control. These groupings were still very much controlled by a 
dominant person or family. There may have been a reason to include these groupings in 
the self sample set. It was decided to exclude these mini groupings from the sample, as it 
could not be identified which system of monitoring they implemented. 
The mini groups identified were: Pepkor Group -Controlled by C Wiese 
FS Group -Controlled by J Liebesman 
Ventron Group -Controlled by W Venter 
4.5.4) Delisted Companies 
All companies that had delisted from the JSE at any time during the five years under 
review, Jan 1991-1996, were excluded. This point is raised further in the limitations of 
the study. 
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4.5.6) Holding Companies 
It was decided to exclude industrial holding companies from the sample set. The holding 
companies do not function as normal business operations. It is the methods used to 
monitor managers with which this study is concerned and not the performance ofholding 
companies, which is invariably a reflection ofthe operating companies results. The. study 
therefore reflects the performances ofthe operating companies ofthe South African 
groups, rather than the entire group's performance. This point is perhaps most relevant in 
relation to the insider group, which is defmed later. · 
The exclusion of the holding companies ensured that any double counting of results was 
prevented. Holding companies were defined using two distinct characteristics. The first 
was that those companies which were merely used as shells by owners to ensure that they 
maintained control over the underlying operating company, were excluded. These shells 
had no real business operations and their results were simply a reflection of the 
underlying operating companies. The Pikwik-Pick n Pay shell relationship is an example 
of such a holding company. Pikwik owns 50% ofPick n Pay and has no business 
operations of its own. The company, Pikwik, is used as a shell to enable Raymond 
Ackerman to keep control of Pick n Pay. 
The second definition was that those companies which controlled companies of similar 
significance in more than one sector, were defined as holding companies and excluded 
from the sample set. This allowed the sample set to reflect companies that operated in 
one specific industry. An in depth analysis could then be made on the sample set in 
relation to the sectors which it comprised. A 75/25 rule was used as a yardstick when 
analysing the companies. Therefore, companies which were operating in more than one 
industry and their minor operations were greater than 25% of their total operations, were 
excluded.· 
The detail of the sample set is illustrated in Table Following : 
Total Sample Analysed (1 January 1991) : 337 
Foreign Companies 25 
Holding Companies 85 
Outsider Controlled 33 
Self Controlled 100 
Insider Controlled 46 
No Classification (not fit any system) 31 
Small Groupings 17 
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Of the Samples identified, the following represent the final groupings : 
1. 
I! Outsider Controlled : 1/1/1991 33 
' l ·- ..... , .. 
I 
..,. ··~ ..~I Changed Structure 20 
Outsider Controlled : 1/1/1996 13 
Self Controlled : 1/1/1991 100 
Delisted I Changed Structure 69 
Self Controlled : 1/1/1996 31 
------------·------·----------------------~ 
Insider Controlled: 111/199f 46 l 
j Delisted I Chan2ed Structure 23 ~j 
[! ~I_n_s_id_e_r_C~o~n~t_ro~ll~e_d_:_1~11_1_1_99~6~--------~23~ 
--------------------~---------------
4. 6) The Defining Characteristics o(the Groupings 
The companies were divided into three groupings: 
• gins 
• gOut 
• gSelf 
= Group Controlled (Insider System) 
= Manager Controlled (Outsider System) 
= Owner Controlled (SelfSystem) 
In order for a company to be classified in a particular grouping, it was necessary that such 
a company had to have maintained the same ownership structure, which complied with 
the group definitions, for the entire five year period under review. Therefore, companies 
which were selected in a particular grouping, were truly representative of a company 
managed by that particular system. 
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The Mcgregors Who Owns Whom was used in order to detennine the ownership 
structures ofthe various companies. Where the exact ownership structure of the company 
was not clear, the company had to be excluded from the sample sets. In cases where 
nominee companies were used and it was not possible to identify the ultimate owner of 
the nominee company, the company had to be excluded. 
4.6.1) Group Controlled Companies (Insider system) 
These companies are controlled by any one of the large South African groupings. Six 
large groupings were identified in this study and these groupings were the same as those 
identified by Gerson ( 1992). 
• Anglo American 
• Sanlam 
• Old Mutual 
• Rembrandt 
• Anglovaal 
• Liberty Life 
These six groups together have controlled at least 70% of the market capitalisation of the 
JSE over the five years of the study. (Mcgregors table p46) 
In order for a company to be classified as a Group Controlled company, it is necessary 
that one ofthe six large South African groupings controls more than 30% of the 
company's equity and that no other coalition controls a significant portion of the stock. 
These stipulations ensure that the company is firmly under the group's control and that 
the group is under no threat from any market forces. Therefore it is assumed that an 
insider system of monitoring is in place. 
If two parties eacq held a significant shareholding in a company and each holding was 
less than 50%, it is possible that market forces could play a large role in determining who 
actually controls the company. If one party controlled the company and the company 
underperformed, it would be easy for the rival party to purchase stock on the open market 
and eventually take control of the firm. Therefore the controlling shareholder must be 
wary of market forces and it is for this reason that such companies were excluded from 
the sample set, as there was scope to believe that such companies were not run according 
to the insider system. 
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The large percentage of equity (voting rights) owned by the group and the relatively 
small holdings by other shareholders, place the group in an almost invincible position 
against potential market take-overs. The absence of the take-over threat leaves the 
monitoring of managers to the group structure (insider system). The group is motivated to 
ensure managers perform, as it has invested large amounts ofwealth into the company 
and any mismanagement will have an adverse effect on the group's performance. A 
further motivating factor to ensure that the groups maintain proper monitoring, is that the 
group's reputation is built on the ability of its companies to perform. Therefore group 
structures attempt to ensure their operating companies are run efficiently. 
The study identified 23 companies that had complied with all the restrictions ofthe group 
definition. The sample is listed in table 2. 
Table 2 : Insider Group Controlled Companies 
Company Name Nature Sector Av. Beta 
Adcock Ingram SA Mutual Pharm & Medical 0.42 
AECI Anglo American Chemicals & Oils 0.78 
A. B. I. Ltd Anglo American Beverages & Hotels 0.73 
CG Smith Foods SA Mutual Food 0.68 
Chemical Services Anglo American Chemicals & Oils 0.57 
C.M.I Anglo American Steel & Allied 0.63 
DaGama Anglo American Cloth, Foot & Textiles 0.95 
Ed gars Anglo American Retail & Wholesalers 0.62 
Ellerines San lam Furniture & Household 0.72 
Highveld Steel Anglo American Steel & Allied 0.9 
Hortors Anglo American Paper & Packaging 0.29 
I&J Anglo vaal Food 0.76 
Medi Clinic Rembrandt Pharm & Medical 0.40 
Nampak SA Mutual Paper & Packaging 0.81 
Oceana SA Mutual Food 0.21 
PPC SA Mutual Building & Construction 0.67 
Romatex SA Mutual Cloth, Foot & Textiles 0.67 
Siltek Anglo vaal Electronics,Elec & Battery 0.76 
Solchem Anglo American Printing & Publishing 0.83 
SA Druggists Sanlam Pharm & Medical 0.9 
S td Engineering* Sanlam Engineering 0.66 
Teljoy San lam Retail & Wholesalers 0.39 
Times Media Anglo American Printing & Publishing 0.53 
*Standard Engineering was delisted in October 1995, It is nevertheless included in the 
study for the four years it was in Operation 
For a more detailed break down of the sample, see appendix L 
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Analysis of sample 
Ofthe 23 firms identified; only one, Medi Clinic corporation, was controlled by 
Rembrandt and no firms were identified as being controlled by the Liberty Life group. 
The main reason for the small representation of these large groupings is the method in 
which they control their companies. Both groupings use a complex method ofholding 
companies to ensure their companies are properly controlled; unfortunately due to this 
study's exclusion ofholding companies, it was not able to include a large percentage of 
Rembrandt and Liberty Life controlled companies. 
The sample grouping included : 10 Companies- controlled by Anglo American 
6 Companies- controlled by SA Mutual 
4 Companies- controlled by Sanalm 
2 Companies- controlled by Anglovaal 
It was expected that this grouping should contain a number of frrms which relied heavily 
on research and development projects. The unique insider system provides an opportunity 
for long term projects to be undertaken by companies which operate in it. 
... -- .. - ~ 
' Pharmaceutical and Medical 3 13% 
Chemical and Oils 2 9% 
Beverages and Hotels 1 4% 
Food 3 13% 
Steel and Allied 2 9% 
The sector break Clothing and Footwear 2 9% 
down of the sample: Retailers and Wholesalers 2 9% 
Furniture and Household 1 4% 
Paper and Packaging 2 9% 
Building and Construction l 4% 
Electronics l 4% 
Printing and Publishing 2 9% 
Engineering 1 4% 
"· --~~-- -i • .-4<" -·~·· ........ ~, • .: .• w;c·,. ~- .... . :"' -.•_•.-'0":".,...-"'.:":'C"' 
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The sample is not dominated by one large sector; rather, it is a representative collection 
of almost all the sectors listed on the JSE industrial board.ln total, 14 different sectors 
are represe~ted in the sample. This result serves to illustrate the diversification of the 
large South African corporate groupings. The corporate groupings control companies in 
almost every sector. The biggest representation is nevertheless from the pharmaceutical 
sector. If the pharmaceutical sector and oil sector contributions were added together, they 
would comprise nearly 25% of the sample. This may have been expected, as it is these 
two sectors which rely greatly on research and development projects and large capital 
expenditures which take time to pay~off. 
4.6.2) Management Controlled Companies (Outsider System) 
These companies are not controlled by any one dominant shareholder. Management in 
these companies is left to run the company as it wishes. Without a dominant group or 
individual to ensure management performs, the company is left at the mercy of the 
incumbent management. However, if management perform badly, they run the risk of 
being taken~over by a hostile rival (Jensen, 1987). These potential rivals are easily able 
to use the capital market to buy enough equity to dispose of management. Those 
companies in which a single set of stakeholders did not own greater than 30% of the 
equity were said to fall into this category. For these companies the threat of a take~over is 
a very real threat and, as such, the managers are motivated through take-over fears. Thus 
companies utilise the outsider system of monitoring to ensure that they are properly 
managed. 
This classification was dependent on the amount of outsider shares which were not 
owned by significant shareholders. It was assumed that it is harder for potential 
purchasers to buy stock from significant stockholders than from the general market. 
Significant stockholders are usually long time investors that have developed relationships 
with management. It is therefore assumed that these significant investors would be 
reluctant to sell their stock. Companies were therefore only included in this group if the 
outstanding shareholding not held by significant stockholders, was great enough to ensure 
its purchase could dislodge the incumbent management team. 
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Table : Outsider Controlled Companies 
......... ' I 
Company Name Sector Av. Beta 
Crookes Brothers Food 0.81 
General Optical Pharm & M~dical 1 
Iscor Steel & Allied 0.38 
Jasco Engineering Electronics, Elec & Battery 
Macadams Bakery Supplies Food 0.5 
Natal Ocean Trawling Food 0.37 
Penrose Printing 0.07 
Sasol Chemicals & Oils 0.77 
Sterling Cloth, Footwear & Textiles 0.67 
Towles Edgar Jacobs Cloth, Footwear & Textiles 0.36 
Usko Steel & Allied · 1.22 
Waltons Retailers & Wholesalers 0.88 
Wooltru Retailers & Wholesalers 0.73 
For a more detailed break down ofthe sample see appendix 2. 
13 Companies were identified as being outsider companies for the entire period. This 
grouping is the smallest in size ofthe three groups. It is to be expected that companies in 
this sample set would not rely heavily on research and development projects. The 
potential short term approach of such a system would ensure that no long term projects 
were undertaken by such companies. 
- . . -· __ ,. ~ 
-·---"""--~-. .. -·--· .... -~ .. -· -..... --~ ~ ··---·- .. ~· ·--· ~-··-· 
Clothing, Footwear and Textiles 2 15% 
Retailers and Wholesalers 2 15% 
Steel and Allied 2 15% 
Sector Break Down Food 3 23% Chemicals and Oils 1 7.5% 
Pharmaceuticals 1 7.5% 
Electronics 1 7.5% 
Printing and Pub 1 ishing 1 7.5% 
< ~ - • 
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Together the retail and clothing sector account for 30% of the sample; this was expected, 
as neither of these two sectors rely on major research and development projects. The 
inclusion ofSasol and Iscor in this grouP. may add a certain extra dimension to this 
sample; Both Iscor and Sasol were state owned companies which were sold o:ffby the 
state through the issuing of equity. These companies may have different characteristics to 
the other companies which were identified, but nevertheless it was decided to include 
these companies in the sample set. 
4.6.3) Owner Controlled Companies (Self system) 
Owner. controlled companies are those companies which are controlled by individuals, 
families or consortiums oth~r than groups. The owners are responsible for managing the 
firm. In order to qualify for this grouping, the controllers had to own more than 30% of 
the equity (voting rights) ofthe company and one of the members of the identifiable 
coalition or family had to serve on the companies board of directors. If the company was 
owned by one individual, then it was required that the individual served as a director. 
It is the controllers that pressure management to perform. These companies are under no 
direct threat from the take-over. market and it is the owners themselves who manage the 
firm. The difficulty of classifying firms into this grouping was in the defining of the 
coalition. It is for this reason that most of the firms listed in this sample are family 
controlled. Family controlled firms are almost all typical ofthe owner controlled system. 
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Table of Owner controlled Firms 
r======================================= 
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Company N arne Nature Sector Av. Beta 
Adonis Kniwear Beneen Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.14 
Adv. Tech. Systems Directors Elec, Electrical & Battery 0.67 
Aries Packaging Directors Paper & Packaging 0.54 
Aroma Liquor Kovensky Family Ret & Wholesalers 0.39 
Arthur Kaplan Jewellers A Kaplan Ret & Wholesalers 0.47 
Bowler Metcalf Directors Paper & Packaging 0.52 
Brenner Mills Ltd. Brenner Family_ Food 0.43 
Burlington Industries Kawitsky Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.21 
Decor Investments Directors Ret & Wholesalers 0.75 
Ensign Clothing Roy Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.26 
F oschini Ltd. Lewis Family Ret & Wholesalers 0.61 
Glodina Holdings Balladon Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.87 
IB Joffe Ltd. Joffee Family Retailers & Wholesalers 0.24 
Ilco Homes Demmers Family Building & Construction 0.32 
Italtile Directors Building & Construction 0.66 
Kopp Electronics Directors Elec, Electrical & Battery 1.07 
Mas Holdings Van Embden Family Retailers & Wholesalers 0.39 
Mathieson & Ashley Ringo Family Furniture & Household 0.35 
N inian & Lester Shroder F amity Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.26 
Nu-World Holdings Directors Elec, Electrical & Battery 0.46 
Pals Holdings Kagan Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles -0.02 
Pick 'n Pay Stores RAckerman Retailers & Wholesalers 0.67 
Publico Ltd Directors Printing & Publishing 0.47 
Put co Carleo Family Transport 0.96 
SA Bias Industries Seabrooke Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.68 
Spescom Electronics Farah Family Elec, Electrical & Battery 1.06 
Strebel group Strebel Family Clothing, Foot & Textiles 0.32 
Transpaco Abelheim Family Paper & Packaging 0.65 
Trencor Ltd. Jowell Family Transi>_ort 0.54 
WB Holdings Directors Food 0.55 
York Timber Tucker Family Building & Construction 0.22 
For a more detailed analysis of the sample see appendix 3. 
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31 Companies were identified as being controlled by one particular family or identifiable 
coalition. The majority ofthese companies had begun as small family businesses and 
then expanded to their present form. The South African system of allowing companies to 
issue low voting stock through the pyramid schemes, has allowed a number of families to 
maintain control of their firms, even though their effective holding of the firm's equity is 
less than the required nite for control. Thus the JSE has a large number of its companies 
owned by single, identifiable owners. 
I ·-·- --
Sector No. Percentage 
Clothing 8 26% 
Retailers and Wholesalers 7 23% 
Electronics 4 13% 
Sector Break Down Paper & Packaging 3 9.5% I Food 2 6.5% i' 
l Building & Construction 3 9.5% i 
i Printing and Publishing 1 3% I 
! Furniture & Hoiusehold 1 3% 
Transport 2 6.5% 
.. 1 
I 
I 
: -··~-~-~--_j .. - ,. __ 
4.6.4) Group Constructions 
The actual number of companies identified in each category of this study is similar to the 
numbers identified by Uliana and Cohen in their 1990 study. Using slightly different 
group definitions, Uliana and Cohen ( 1990) identified 39 owner controlled companies 
and 28 Conglomerate controlled companies. Unfortunately the Uliana and Cohen (1990) 
study did not specify manager controlled companies. 
In grouping companies according to control classification, Uliana ( 1988) selected sample 
companies such that three matched groups based on industry and size resulted. In a 
similar study Shuttleworth (1987) did not employ matched groups. The findings ofboth 
the Uliana ( 1988) and Shuttleworth ( 1987) study were similar and thus indicate that there 
does not seem to be a bias in favour of or against groups constructed on different bases 
with regard to industry or size (Uliana and Cohen, 1990). The groups in this study were 
not constructed on the matching bases, but the risk adjustment (see section 4.7) and the 
use of a base year were utilised to ensure that the size and industry effects were 
accounted for in the final results ofthe study. 
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In a study conducted by Savage ( 1978) of the 100 largest S.A industrial companies 
quoted on the JSE, it was found that only 14% of these companies were management 
controlled. Although this study uses slightly different criteria to categorise management 
controlled companies, it nevertheless indicates that management controlled firms are in 
the minority in South Africa. The small management controlled grouping is therefore 
consistant with the Savage ( 1978) findings. 
4. 7) Limitations of the Studv 
4.7.1) Winners Bias 
The study parameters excluded any frrms that may have delisted in the sample period. 
These exclusions limited the study to only analysing those companies which had been 
successful for the five year period. The study may therefore have taken on what may be 
defined as a "winners bias". The sample analysed represented those companies that had 
succeeded under their particular monitoring system and not necessarily the monitoring 
systems true performance. The study may therefore be measuring the relative successes 
of each system relative to the other, -rather tha.rl the actual ability of the various systems to 
monitor managers. In order to ensure that all firms met the five year criteria and were 
compared over the same time frame, companies which had de listed over the period had to 
be excluded from the study. A further problem created by companies delisting is that 
available information on these companies is seldom acessible. It was therefore impossible 
to use companies that had delisted in the sample set. 
4.7.2) Change in Ownership Structure 
If ownership structures are changed and this results in a change of monitoring systems, it 
may take some time before the company is affected by the new system. The problem for 
researchers is, therefore, deciding when a new system has changed managerial styles. In 
order to avoid such problems, this study analyses firms with management styles which 
have remained constant for the full five year period. Perhaps better conclusions could 
have been drawn by analysing firms which changed monitoring styles; this method would 
have allowed for the monitoring systems to be compared directly. However, such a study 
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would encompass the problem stated: that it would have to defme when the changes to 
the monitoring system took effect. It is possible to expect that different companies would 
have different time horizons for changes to ta..l(e effect and as such the feasibility of such 
a study is seriously questioned. 
4.7.3) Combination of A & B type groupings 
A limitation of the study may lie in the fact that firms which were controlled by A and B 
type groups (as defined in section 3) were included in the same sample. It may have been 
more accurate to divide the group controlled companies into A and B groupings. 
However, in order to get a meaningful sample size, it was decided to combine the A and 
B type groupings into one. There is a sense, however, that it is not strictly correct to 
compare the management of a mutual organisation to that of a conventional industrial 
company (Gerson, 1992, p14). There may thus be a case to leave out the Sanlam and Old 
Mutual controlled companies; however, as these companies control such a large 
percentage of the companies listed on the JSE, a study without them would provide no 
conclusive results. 
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Conclusion 
·section four details the appproach which was taken to define the three groupings and 
the measurements which will be used to conclude on the study's null hypothesis: that 
all monitoring systems monitor managers equally. The following section will elaborate 
on the statistical methods which were used to test the null hypothesis, the reasons for 
using the various statistical techniques and the results which were obtained. 
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·.Section V 
··Statistical Tests 
And 
Results 
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. Introduction 
THis section details the statistical tests used in the study, as well as the findings. This research was concerned with identifying differences in the populations 
examined. In order to reach this objective, the means ofthe samples were used and 
analysed to ascertain whether they differed. It was important that if differences were 
identified, they represented real differences in the population, rather than merely arising 
from the random sampling process. Consequently, it was necessary to test the means for 
the significance of difference. · · ... 
The t-test compares the means oftwo samples and identifies the probability that the 
difference between the sample means is due to sample variation. In certain instances 
where more than two samples are identified for analysis (in this case, three), it is not 
appropriate to merely carry out the t-test across all pairs of samples. This approach would 
increase the probability of error. At a 95% level of confidence, there is a five percent 
probability of a Type I error occurring. Type 1 errors occur when the statistical testing 
indicates significant difference and in reality n.o real significant difference exists. Since 
there are three combinations of samples, the t-teSt would be performed three times and 
would increase the probability of an error (Underhill and Bradfield, 1994). 
The Analysis of Variance technique (ANOVA) tests for significant differences in the 
means of more than two samples (Underhill and Bradfield, 1994). At a 95% level of 
confidence, the probability that the test would conclude an erroneous result is limited to 
five percent. 
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5.1) Statistical Assumptions 
Both the Anova test and the t-tests are parametric tests. The main assumption when using 
a parametric test is that the underlying data set is normally distributed (Underhill and 
Bradfield, 1994 ). Thus before using these tests, it is imperative to define whether the 
underlying data set is normally distributed or not. 
Distribution ofthe Underlying Sample Sets. 
Histograms were run in order to test the underlying data. 
Histogram : Sample of Insider Companies 
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Summary 
Obs. 
Insider 65 
Histogram : Sample of Outsider Companies 
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Normal 
··.~ 
Std Dev Skew 
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Histogram : Self Companies 
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The normal histograms which are documented above, indicate that the three samples do 
not comply with the normal assumption. All three groupings had exceptionally high 
skewnes and kurtosis measures. The Insider grouping had a skewness level of 4.85, 
which was evident from the histogram in the manner that the data was skewed to the 
right. Similarly the Outsider sample ha~ a skewness level of 4.96 and this was also 
evident from the slanting of the data to the right. The Self grouping had a skewness level 
of~ 5.97, caused by the data being skewed to the left. All three samples also had very 
high kurtosis measures, with the Self sample having a kurtosis of over 60. It is generally 
accepted that a skewness level ofless than two implies that the Wlderlying sample set is 
normally distributed (Daniel, 1983). It was evident that none of the presented sample 
groupings complied with this normality assumption. 
In such a scenario, one has two options. Either adjust the sample groupings for outliers 
and continue with a more normally distributed sample set, or else make use of a statistical 
testing technique which does not rely on the Wlderlying data sets being normally 
distributed. A statistical technique which does not rely on the Wlderlying samples being 
normally distributed is known as non-parametric testing. Such testing, while not being as 
powerful as the parametric tests, nevertheless supplies a valuable method from which to 
test the null hypothesis (Daniel, 1983). 
It was decided to adjust the samples for outliers and attempt to structure the sample sets 
in a more normal, fitting manner. The samples were therefore adjusted for outliers. The 
outliers are dearly visible from the frequency coWltS below. 
The new sample sets were tested for normality. 
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Insider Grouping (adjusted) 
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The new results indicate that the adjusted samples presented a much closer normal 
distribution set. The only sample which was slightly above the 2 point skewness measure 
was the Self sample. 
Further evidence of the sampl~s conforming to normality can be obtained from a closer 
inspection of the central lim¥ theorem. The central limit~ theorem indicates that as one's. 
sample increases and moves closer to infinity, so the underlying assumption of normality 
can be assumed (Underhill and Bradfield, 1994). It is generally accepted that a sample of 
100 observations is sufficient to assume normality (Underhill and Bradfield, 1994). In 
two of the three cases, thesamples presented have-observations of well over 100. The 
Self grouping, even after it has been adjusted for outliers, has over 150 observations. 
It can therefore be assumed that the adjusted samples all comply with the underlying 
assumption that they are normally distributed. Parametric testing can, therefore, be 
executed on the adjusted samples. It was felt that to execute parametric testing on the 
adjusted samples would provide a more conclusive test than if non-parametric tests were 
run on the unadjusted sample. Nevertheless, the unadjusted samples were tested non-
parametrically to determine whether the test results differed. 
One further test was run on the adjusted samples to ensure that normality was adhered to. 
The test known as the Schapiro Wilk W Test was executed in order to test that the 
underlying samples all had homogenity in their variances. The findings ofthis test further 
added to the evidence that the adjusted samples were normally distributed. 
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5.2) Parametric Testing 
5.2.1) Anova Test 
The Anova results for the adjusted sample set indicate that there is no significant difference at the 95% 
confidence level between the three groupings mean returns. The p value of the Anova table is 0.8878 and is 
higher than the 0.05 level of significance parameter. 
Anova Test 
Overall p value: p < .8878 
Insider (2.48) Outsider (2.37) Self(2.58) 
Insider - .8076 .7909 
Outsider .8076 - .6337 
Self .7909 .6337 
! ' 1 i. ~ 
------·-··---.. .----------)·~=-=-'~---··-· _, ___ ... _.,_, __ _,, ___ ,..,._._,r.~~~,.;A..,._>r<P4'-.r~~~~ 
The summary of mean table (below) illustrates the precise value of each groupings mean 
returns. The Self grouping, with a mean return of2.58, is greater than both the Outsider 
(2.37) and Insider (2.48) groupings. 
Mean Table 
Insider Mean 2.4848 
Outsider Mean 2.3738 
Self Mean 2.5808 
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The box and whisker plot for the adjusted sample further demonstrate the close proximity 
of the various sample groupings. The samples overlap to a large extent and there is very 
little difference between them. This illustrates the relative closeness of the returns. 
Box and Whisker of Adjusted Sample. 
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5.3) Frequency Distributions o(the Sample·Data 
From the median plot it is possible to gauge the distribution of the sample sets. The box 
indicates where 50% of the ·observations were identified. The cumulative counts adds 
further to the analysis. The insider group consisted of 115 observations. This was the 
return of the 23 companies identified in table 2 for all five. years under review. The 
outsider group consisted of65 observations ( 13 companies for five years) and the Self 
group consisted of 154 observations (one observation, Standard Engineering, was 
excluded in the final year). 
The Insider returns are mostly distributed between the 0 and 4 return marks. 83% of the 
data points lie in this region. The majority ofthe returns- 51%- lie in the region between 
0 and 2. Translated into ordinary returns, this is between -100% and+ 100%. Of the 
Outsider returns, 55% of the returns were positioned between the 0 and 2 marks. For the 
Self sample set it was illustrated that 92% of the data set was in the range 0-10. On closer 
inspection it was established that just over half of the data was to be found between the 0 
and 2 range. 
The frequency plots add further to the evidence that there is very little difference between 
the different samples. 
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Frequency Plots 
Self: Frequency Plot 
i. Category Count Cumul Count %in Count 
I 
-70 <X< -60 1 1 0.649 .._; 
!- -60 <X< -50 0 I 0 
' 
-50< X< -40 0 1 0 
-40 <X< -30 0 1 0 
' 
-30 <X< -20 1 2 .649 
' I 
-20 <X< -10 1 3 .649 
J 
-IO<X< 0 5 8 3.247 I 
0 <X< IO 143 151 92.857 
10<X<20 2 153 1.299 
20 <X< 30 0 153 0 
30 <X <40 I 154 .649 -----·~-----··--~--·-·-------·-·---.! 
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Outsider Frequency Plot 
---t---- --c:-c:< 
l 
Category Count Cumul. Count %in Count I 
-6<X <-4 1 1 1.539 J 
-4<X <-2 1 2 1.539 
!• 
-2<X< 0 0 2 0 
' 
O<X< 2 36 38 55.384 
2<X< 4 18 56 27.692 
4<X< 6 4 60 6.153 
6<X< 8 0 60 0 
8<X< 10 1 61 1.539 
10<X<12 1 62 1.539 
t• 12<X<14 2 64 3.077 !l 14<X<16 0 64 0 
16<X<18 0 64 0 
i 18<X<20 0 64 0 I 
I· 20<X<22 0 64 0 
.. 
I 22<X<24 0 ! 64 0 
24<X<26 0 64 0 
: 26<X<28 0 64 0 
28<X<30 0 64 0 
30<X<32 0 64 0 
I 32<X<34 0 64 0 
' 34<X<36 0 64 0 
' 
' 
36<X<38 1 65 1.539 
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Insider 
,.- '·--··====--=---=---=-=--=--=-=--=======-=--=·=--=-.=·····-:::::. ==--=-::::: .... :::-: ... ~---~---~-:-:--=:::::::., 
r ! Category Count. Cumul. Count· %Count 
! 
j; 
I 
-4<X<-2 0 0 0 
-2<X< 0 1 1 0.8696 
O<X< 2 59 60 52.1739 
2<X< 4 36 96 83.4783 
4<X< 6 11 107 I 93.0435 
6<X< 8 4 Ill 96.5217 
8<X< 10 2 113 98.2609 
10<X<l2 0 113 98.2609 
12<X<l4 0 113 98.2609 
14<X<l6 0 113 98.2609 
16<X<l8 0 113 98.2609 
20<X<22 0 113 98.2609 
22<X<24 1 114 99.1304 
24<X<26 1 115 100.00 
In an attempt to clarify the debate as to whether or not adjusting the sample set for 
outliers had any bearing on the final outcome ofthe study, it was decided to test the 
unadjusted samples on a non-parametric basis. 
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5.4) Non Parametric Tests 
Although non-parametric testing is not as powerful as parametric testing, it nevertheless 
has a number of advantages : 
5.4.1) Advantages of Non-Parametric Testing (Daniel, 1983, pp 16) 
As most non-parametrics have very few assumptions, the chances of the tests 
being used improperly are very small. 
Computations can be quickly and easily performed for some procedures. 
Concepts and Methods are generally easier to understand than with parametric 
testing. 
Non parametric testing can be used when data is measured on a weak scale, such 
as count data or rank data. 
5.4.2) Scheffe's Test 
The Scheffe's Test was used as the non-parametric test to determine whether the null 
hypothesis held true or not. 
Scheffe's Test 
Marked Differences are significant at p < .05 
The following table illustrates the various p values 
-~-------- ..... ---
·-·· .. -- .... .. ~~~~-·· 
Insider : Mean = 2.86 Self: Mean = 2.33 Outsider : Mean 
Insider Group 
-
.7307 .8504 
Self Group .7307 - .9980 
Outsider Group .8504 .9980 -
94 
2.38 
The test delivered the same result as did the Anova test with adjusted samples. Both tests 
confrrmed that the null hypothesis of the study held true and that there were no 
differences in the various sample's means. 
Box and Whisker of non-adj~sted samples 
. ~·· ' .-..,-. -~ .. , . ' 
· .. }~-:·.-,_ ;--~)~-(-~:(~~-~./·~: :>:,~; -.·--.<y;_·~: ,. •,' 
.. , ':~· -t<•· --
Box & W!isl<er Plot VAR1 
~~-----------------------------. 
-- --
20 
0 
---ii: 
...; 
' > -20 
-<40 
- =1\Air>-l\lax 
: '-ledan value ~0~------------------------------~ 
::::J 25".1.-75°.1. 
Ins. Out 
VAF':I 
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5.5) Conclusions 
The first and most important conclusion that can be drawn from the study, is that the null 
hypothesis holds true: no significant differences exist between the mean returns ofthe 
three groupings. We can therefore conclude that the monitoring system used by listed 
companies to monitor managers has no effect on the companies' results. 
This conclusion must, however, be qualified in light ofthe various assumptions and 
limitations of the study, as detailed in Section IV. 
It is possible, as has already been stated in this thesis, to assume that different companies, 
depending on their operations, will perform better under different monitoring systems. 
The results of this study tend to indicate that there is a certain performance measure that 
the market demands. If a company and its monitoring system can not provide the 
acceptable return, then either the company will have to change its monitoring system, or 
else the market will not tolerate its survival and it will have to delist. 
This conclusion is similar to the survivor approach adopted by Fama and Jensen (1983b). 
It was their belief that all forms of organisations compete with one another in their ability 
to provide goods and services at the lowest cost. It is concluded in this thesis that all 
forms of monitoring compete with one another and that only the best monitoring systems 
survive. This does not mean to say that only one form of monitoring should exist, but 
rather that the best monitoring system will prevail. If a particular system can not meet the 
requirements of the market, it will soon be replaced by another system. It is possible that 
this will continue until the best monitoring system for that company is determined. There 
seems to be an.acceptable return requirement which the market dictates. All monitoring 
systems must therefore ensure that they provide a return which is within the acceptable 
regiOn. 
The question may well be asked: why do all three monitoring systems still operate? 
A possible answer is that certain monitoring systems operate better under different 
conditions. Each particular firm may have its own optimal monitoring system, but it is 
feasible that these optimum monitoring systems differ from firm to firm. In much the 
same way that a partnership, as opposed to a closed corporation or company, may be the 
more appropriate business form for a given business enterprise, so it may be that the 
internal monitoring system may be the more appropriate system for that firm, as opposed 
to the alternatives. 
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5.6) The Results of this Study in Relation to Others 
5.6.1) International 
The results of international studies must be viewed with a degree of caution. Most foreign 
countries have different economic environments to South Africa and thus their findings 
may not hold true for the South African setting. 
An American study conducted by Oswald and Jahera (1991) concluded that increased 
ownership of companies resulted in increased shareholder returns. The conclusion of the 
Oswald and Jahera study favours the insider and self form of monitoring, as opposed to 
the outsider form. Both the insider and self monitoring systems rely on shareholders 
increasing their ownership stakes in companies and assuming a role as monitors. The 
outsider system, which is so prevalent in the USA, does not encourage shareholders to 
form large holdings. 
It is interesting to note that a number of American studies have demonstrated that the 
forming of large shareholder blocks, significant shareholders, has resulted in increased 
shareholder returns (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988) (Oswald and Jahera) (Shome and 
Singh, 1995). This evidence tends to illustrate that a system of internal or self monitoring 
may, in fact, be more efficient for American companies to utilise. 
5.6.2) South African Studies 
Uliana and Cohen ( 1990) concluded in their study that no difference existed regarding the 
return on shareholder equity and shareholder compensation, between conglomerate 
controlled, foreign controlled and owner controlled firms. The results of this study tend to 
support the Uliana and Cohen (1990) finding. Both studies concluded that no difference 
existed between the returns ofthe various control structures. It appears that the Uliana 
and Cohen (1990) finding, which included foreign firms, would add to this study's 
results. Foreign controlled firms, it is suggested, would have to provide shareholders the 
same competitive returns that the other firms in the market were providing, or else they 
themselves would face extinction. 
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Uliana and Day ( 1990) performed a study on owner controlled companies versus 
professionally managed companies. The study examined financial differences between 
the two sets of companies. The study concluded that owner managed companies were 
marked by financial conservatism in relation to professiona1ly managed companies. This 
result appears to be consistent with the risk profiles of the sample groupings in this study. 
However, the Uliana and Day (1990) study differed substantially from this study in its 
group classifications. The study also used only accounting measures to test its findings 
and, as such, a comparison between this study and the Uliana and Day ( 1990) study is not 
drawn, as the two studies are too different to compare. 
In a study conducted in 1988, Afileck-Graves, Burt and Cleasby concluded that the 
shareholder returns of South African conglomerates do not differ significantly at the 95% 
level of confidence from the returns offered by a randomly selected market portfolio. 
These results further substantiate this study's findings, as the conglomerate grouping used 
by Affleck-Graves, Burt and Cleasby was similar in form to the insider grouping used in 
this study. 
5. 7) Concluding Comments 
The South African Government appears determined to see that a number of the major 
South African companies unbundle. The Government believes that such an unbundling of 
corporate control would enable new entrepreneurs to gain power and it would facilitate 
·the growth ofthe South African economy. The Governrrient has even commissioned a 
committee to develop an unbundling law, which will then ensure that companies are 
legally forced to unbundle (Volschenk, 1996). 
The Insider system of control was not found to monitor its managers any worse than the 
other systems of control. It would seem that any legislation which impeded the insider 
type of monitoring system could have only a negative consequence for the South African 
economy, as a relatively efficient monitoring mechanism would be eliminated; 
If the Government implemented a law which prevented companies from operating in a 
pyramid form, it is debatable whether such a law would actually affect the Insider system 
at all. The recent unbundlings have shown that the large groups can afford to hold high 
portions of equity, even when their pyramid structures have collapsed. For example, the 
recent unbundlings of the Sanlam and Old Mutual grouping have left both Sanlam and 
Old Mutual controlling the majority stakes in the newly formed unbundled companies. 
Sanlam still maintains the greatest individual stake in Gencor and its unbundled parts, 
98 
\ 
whereas Old Mutual still controls more than 30% ofBarlows and its newly formed 
unbundled parts (Barr, Ger!)on and Kantor, 1995). 
The forced unbundling would probably have the most effect on those companies which 
are owned and managed by the same people, ie, those who make use of the self system. 
Thus it is feasible that an unbundling policy may indeed further concentrate the control of 
the South African economy. 
Certainly the elimination of the pyramid structures on the JSE would make forming new 
groupings much harder. In the light ofthis study's results, it is suggested that the 
government attempt to create a favourable climate for groupings to evolve, as this would 
encourage the insider monitoring system to develop and create an important alternative 
from which shareholders can choose when monitoring managers.Already new black 
groupings such as Nail seem set to attempt to manage their companies via the insider 
system (Barr, Gerson and Kantor, 1995). The findings of this study thus support the view 
shared by Barr, Gerson and Kantor (1995) and Barr and Kantor(1994) that the 
unbundling of the large South African groupings is contrary to the best interests of the 
shareholders 
5.8) Future Studies 
This thesis has attempted to analyse the various monitoring systems which have 
dominated the South African corporate environment. The results of this thesis are thus 
limited to the South African economy. It is believed that future studies may attempt to 
establish why certain monitoring systems have evolved in the countries in which they are 
found. An in depth analysis focussing on a number of countries may establish which 
system provides which countries with the most efficiency. 
On a local level, it is felt that a further break down of the monitoring systems into more 
defined groupings may add to the findings ofthis thesis. A stricter definition of the 
insider system, with type A and B groupings being classified separately, may provide an 
interesting analysis ofthe performance ofthe mutuals as monitors. 
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Section VI 
" 
Summary 
100 
Introduction 
The results of this study provide evidence that no significant difference exists at the 95% confidence level between the mean returns of the three monitoring systems 
identified. 
Companies that had maintained the same monitoring systems for the five years under 
review, all obtained a similar return for their shareholders. This finding has led to the 
conclusion that if a particular monitoring system is not efficient for a company, _it will 
soon be replaced by a monitoring system that provides the company's shareholders a 
competitive return. 
The findings thus indicate that different companies, depending on their culture, industry 
and form of operation, will be better suited by different monitoring systems. 
The study originally set out to determine whether, in fact, one monitoring system 
outperformed the other two. It is therefore concluded that no single monitoring system is 
better than the rest on a country level, but rather that particular systems provide better 
solutions to the agency problem for different companies. 
This finding therefore explains to a degree the reason why all three monitoring systems 
still operate in the South African economy. 
...._ 
The other intended objective of the study was to add to the current debate on whether 
unbundling and, in particular, the tight concentration of economic power, is detrimental 
to the South African economy. 
The results of the study tend to suggest that insider companies, those controlled by the 
major South African groupings, do not underperform compared to the other companies. 
The findings, therefore, support the current status quo ofthe South African economy. 
It is concluded that the current attempts by the South African government to force the 
large South African groups to relinquish control of their operating companies is, in fact, 
detrimental to the efficiency of the economy as a whole. It is further highlighted that 
forced unbundling may affect the selfmonitoring system and the owner/managers to a 
greater degree than it would the group .structures. 
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The group structures provide an efficient alternative to the other monitoring systems and 
it is felt that any attempts to eliminate this option would only impede on the efficiency of 
South African corporations. 
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Appendix 1 
Insider/Group Controlled Companies 
Company name 
Year Year Year Year Year 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Adcock Ingram 
Controller: SA Mutual "+/-74% "+/-74% "+/-74% "+/-74% "+1-74% 
AECI 
Controller: Anglo American >70% >70% >70% >70% >65% 
Amalgamated Beverage ·Industries ltd 
Controller: Anglo American "+/-68% "+/-68% "+/-68% "+/-68% "+/-68% 
t< 
CG Smith Foods Ltd t 
Controller: SA Mutual "+/-83% "+/-83% "+/-83% "+/-83% "+/-83% 
,I 
·chemical Services ltd 
Controller: Anglo American >65% >65% ·>65% >65% >65% 
Consolidated Metaliurgicallndustrtes I Controller: Anglo American >55% >55% >55% >55% >55% Oa Gama Textiles 
Controller: Anglo American >66% >65% >65% >60% >60% !' 
Edgars Stores 
II Controller: Anglo American >62% >64% >64% >64% >64% Elierine Holdings Ltd 
Controller: San lam "+/-68% "+/-68% "+/-68% "+/-69% "+/-69% If' ~~ 
Highveld Steel & Vanadium 
Controller: Anglo American >53% >62% >62% >62% >62% l 
Hortors Ltd J 
Controller: Anglo American >88% >88% >88% >88% >81% l! lrv In & Johnson Ltd it 
Controller: Anglovaal "+1-70% "+1-70% "+1-70% "+1-70% "+1-70% !! 
I' 
Medi Clinic Corporation I Controller: Rembrandt "+/- 93% "+/-93% "+/-86% ''+/-85% "+/-81% 
Nampak Ltd 
,; 
Controller: SA Mutual "+/-65% "+/-65% "+/-65% "+/-65% "+/-65% "1' I' 
Oceana Fishing Group Ltd I; Controller: SA Mutual "+/-70% "+/-69% "+/-68% ''+/-68% "+/-68% 
. Pretoria Portland Cement ,/ 
Controller: SA Mutual >63% >63% >63% >63% >63% ( 
Romatex Ltd 
lr Controller: SA Mutual >55% >55% >55% >55% >55% 
Slltek Ltd 
Controller: Anglovaal >65% >65% >63% >57% >57% 
Sole hem lnv estments' Holdings 
Controller: Anglo American >76% >79% >79% >79% >79% 
South African Druggists r 
Controller: Sanlam "+/- 89% "+/- 85% "+/-85% "+/-84% "+/-84% t I~ Standard Engineering 
11 
Controller: Sanlam >77% >77% >77% >77% >83% 
Telj oy Holdings 
Controller: San lam >70% >54% >54% >60% >60% !I 
limes Media Ltd 
Controller. Anglo American >65% >65% >ss% >74% >74% 
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Outsider Controlled Companies 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Crookes Brothers 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Croo!ols Family Crookes Family Crookes Family Crookes Family Crookes Family 
%Held 20% 20% 20% 22% 22% 
General OpUeal 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Nedbank Nedbank Nedbank Ned bank Ned bank 
%Held 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 
lscor Ltd 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Ind. Dev. Corp Ind. Oev. Corp Ind. Dev. Corp Standard Bank Standard Bank 
%Held 16% 16% 16% 19% 22% 
Jaseo Elaetronies 
Mo& Significant Shareholder. Delta PLC Delta PLC Delta PLC Delta PLC Della PLC 
%Held 21% 21% 21% 21% 21% 
Macadams Bakery Supplies 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Poulliar1. R Poulliart. R Poulliart. R Poulliart. R Poulliar1. R ... 
%Held 16% 25% 25% 26% 30% 
Natal Ocean Trawling 
Mo& Significant Sham holder Libertas Admin. Libertas Admin. LibertasAdmin. Ubertas Admin. Libertas Admin. 
%Held 27% 27% 27% 22% 21% 
Ponrose Holdings 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Mekler. J Nat. Pers. Bpk Alletzhauser. A Uys. D Uys. D 
%Held 21% 29% 29% 23% 30% 
Sasol Ud 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Konoil Pll Konoil PIL Konoil PIL STD Bank STO Bank 
%Held 16% 15% 16% 13% 16% 
Sterling Clothing 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual 
%Held 21% 22% 22% 22% 22% 
Towles, Edgar, Jacobs 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: Jacobs. R Jacoba R Jacobs. R Jacoba R Jacobs. R 
%Held 16% 16% 16% 17% 17% 
Usko 
Mo& Significant Shareholder. I:Klr I:Klr I:K>r I:Klr 19<or 
%Held 28% 27% 28% 28°/o 28% 
Waltons Stationery ... 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: CNA Gallo CNA Gallo CNA Gallo CNA Gallo Pepkor 
%Held 16% 16% 16% 16%. 3Q1J/a 
WooUru 
Mo& Significant Shareholder: SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual SA Mutual 
%Held 27% 27% 27% 26.% 26% 
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Self I Owner Controlled Companies 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Adonis Knitwear & Holdings 
Majority Shareholder: Bencen Family Bencen Family Bencen Family Bencen Family Bencen Family 
%Held >70% >70% >70% >70% >70% 
Advanced Technical Systems 
Majority Shareholder: Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
%Held >75% >75% >75% >55% >55% 
Aries Packaging 
Majority Shareholder: Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
%Held >70% >70% >70% >70% >55% 
Aroma Liquor 
Majority Shareholder: Koven9<y Family Koven9<y Family Koven9<y Family Koven9<y Family Koven9<y Family 
%Held >75% >80% >80% >70% >70% 
Arthur Kaplan Jewellery 
Majority Shareholder: Kaplan. A Kaplan. A Kaplan. A Kaplan. A Kaplan. A 
%Held >70% >70% >70% >70% >70% 
Bowler Metcalfe 
Majority Shareholder: Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
%Held >80% >80% >80% >70% >70% 
Brenner Mills 
Majority Shareholder: Brenner Family Brenner Family Brenner Family Brenner Family Brenner Family 
%Held >75% >75% >75% >75% >75% 
Burlington Industries 
Majority Shareholder: Kawit9<y Family Kawit9<y Family Kawit9<y Family Kawit9<y Family Kawit9<y Family 
%Held >65% >65% >65% >65% >65% 
Decor lnv estments 
Majority Shareholder: Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
%Held >70% >70% >70% >70% >53% 
Ensign Clothing 
Majority Shareholder: Roy Family Roy Family Roy Family Roy Family Roy Family 
%Held >50% >50% >50% >50% >50% 
Foschint• .. 
Majority Shareholder: Lewis Family Lewis Family Lewis Family Lewis Family Lewis Family 
%Held >50% >50% >50% >50% >50% 
Glodlna 
Majority Shareholder: Balladon Family Balladon Family Balladon Family Balladon Family Balladon Family 
%Held >70% >70% >70% >70% >70% 
IB Joffee 
Majority Shareholder: Joffee Family Joffee Family Jaffee Family · Joffee Family Joffee Family 
%Held >75% >75% >75% >75% >75% 
llco Homes 
Majority Shareholder: Demmers. A Demmers. A Demmers. A Demmers. A Demmers. A 
%Held 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 
Ita lite 
Majority Shareholder: Directors Directors Directors Directors Directors 
%Held >65% >65% >65% >65% ">65% 
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Kopp Electronics 
Majority Shareholder: DirectorS 
%Held >60% 
Mas Holdings'" 
Majority Shareholder: Van Embden Family 
%Held >60% 
Mathieson & Ashley Holdings 
Majority Shareholder: Ringo Family 
%Held >74% 
Ninian & Lester Holdings 
Majority Shareholder: Directors 
%Held >50% 
Nu -World Holdings 
Majority Shareholder: Directors· 
%Held >70% 
Pals Holdings 
Majority Shareholder: Kagan Family 
%Held >50% 
Pick n Pay Stores'" 
Majority Shareholder: Ackerman. R 
%Held >50% 
Publico'" 
Majority Shareholder: Directors 
%Held >45% 
Puleo 
Majority Shareholder: Cartee Family 
%Held >50% 
SA Bias Industries .. •• 
Majority Shareholder: Seabrooks Family 
%Held >80% 
Spescom Electronics 
Majority Shareholder: Directors 
%Held >50% 
Strebel Group 
Majority Shareholder: Strebel Family 
%Held >65% 
Transpaco 
Majority Shareholder: Abelheim Family 
%Held >45% 
Trencor .... 
Majority Shareholder: Jewell Family 
%Held >48% 
WBHoldings 
Majority Shareholder: Directors 
%Held >40% 
York limber 
Majority Shareholder: Tucker Family 
%Held >45% 
w~ 
Appendix 3 
(contd) 
Directors Directors 
>60% >60% 
Van Embden Family Van Embden Family 
>57% >57% 
Ringo Family Ringo Family 
>75% >75% 
Directors Directors 
>50% >50% 
Directors Directors 
>70% >70% 
Kagan Family Kagan Family 
>50% >50% 
Ackerman. R Ackerman. R 
>50% >50% 
Directors Directors 
>40% >40% 
Cartee Family Cartee Family 
>50% >50% 
Seabrooks Family Seabrooks Family 
>80% >80% 
Directors Directors 
>40% >40% 
Strebel Family Strebel Family 
>65% >65% 
Abelheim Family Abelheim Family 
>45% >45% 
Jewell Family Jewell Family 
>48% >48% 
Directors Directors 
>50% >SO% 
Tucker Family Tucker Family 
>45% >45% 
Directors 
>60% 
Van Embden Family 
>58% 
Ringo Family 
>75% 
Directors 
>50% 
Directors 
>60% 
Kagan Family 
>50% 
Ackerman. R 
>50% 
Directors 
>70% 
Cartee Family 
>50% 
Seabrooks Family 
>80% 
Directors 
>40% 
Strebel Family 
>65% 
Abelheim Family 
>45% 
Jewell Family 
>48% 
Directors 
>50% 
Tucker Family 
>45% 
··-
---··-··•··h~'" __ , __ ,.. .. _____ 
-- ··-----------~""=~ 
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Directors f 
>60% 
J 
lr Van Embden Family 
>58% I~ 
if Ringo Family 
>75% I~ 
F 
Directors II >60% !' II Directors 
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" ::t 
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